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Part I - INFORMATIONAL HEARING

EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANNING
FOR CALIFORNIA'S NUCLEAR POWERPLANTS

•

I.

Opening Statement:

II.

Witnesses

Chairwoman Gwen Moore

Dean Kunihiro -- Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

~egion

5

Nick Nikas -- Federal Emergency Management
Administration (FEMA)
~~ili!l-QQ~ratQ!~

Carney Ouye -- Sacramento Municipal Utility District
Francis C. Jackley -- Manager, Nuclear Engineering and
Licensing, Southern California Edison
James G. Shiffer -- Vice-President, Nuclear Operations,
Pacific Gas & Electric Company
State and Local Government
-------------------------Anne Vasquez -- Manager, Nuclear Power Plant Planning,
State Office of Emergency Services
Sean Crowder -- Amador County

.

lAW ON NUClEAR EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANNING

ra Atomic Energy Act, there is an established
sibility between state and federal governments.
recentl described their respective
nder t e system of "dual regulation. 11
federal government maintains complete control
sa
and 'nuclear' aspects of energy
on; the states exercise their traditional
over the need for additional generating
, the type of generating facilities to be
, land use, ratemaking, and the like .
• Energy Commission, 103 S. Ct. 1713, 1726
nuclear reactor must obtain an operating
federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission. One of
ec nditions to obtaining a license under NRC
e adoption and implementation of a satisfactory
e
an by the operator. What constitutes a
a is essentially a matter of federal law. The
lations (10 CFR 50.47 and Appendix E) are
C has decided that FEMA will make the initial
adequacy for licensing purposes. (50 FR 19323,
e ement in the emergency response plan
articipation in planning and implementation
ocal 9overnment. (See 10 CFR
( 6) ' ( 14) ' ( 16)).
ta t element is information management,
e otification of local governments and the
(See 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3),(4),(5),(7)).
ant element is identification of public health
asures for protecting public health for persons
he nuclear power plant site. (10 CFR
),(12). A federal appeals court recently
ement was not satisfied where a utility licensee
als in the general area of the plant.

U.S. Nuclear-A
Could Prove I

tists~y
vm-•l!ll!l u evacuee might get a heavier

By Bw.. PAUL

a.n .Rqomrr o/T'IIm wAU. I~ J~A&.

'ne erne~ evacuation plus for the
nearly 100 commercial nuclear reactor~ in
the 1J S. are outdated and could prove lnef·

fecttve ln the event of an accident.

II

~

scientists and former government energy
omctals contend.
The nationwide debate over the evacua·
tion plans, many of which were formulated
after the 'l'hree MJit' Island accident In
1979, Is certain to mcrease ln the ww of
the Cbemobyl disaster tn the Soviet UDkiL
"Tbe temperature bu been turned
the argument 1s roinl to grow,"
sepb Hendrie, former cbalrman of the :N\1-clear Regulatory Commission and MW a
senter scientist at Brookhaven Na.t1o!W
Laboratory in New York.
Current V.S. evacuation plans call for
people to be quickly evacuated ma 10-mik!
radius around a damaged reactor. By
dl1lls must be conducted every two yem.
In tbese drills, utility and government offt·
cials practice eJISUt'inf that. In 1m

111tttmr in !WI ear 111 an
tbu if be ~ b:l hll the ~ cloled.
The NRC currently Is studymj- wn6f-tc reduce tbe evacuation r.ooe radius, but
tbe
Is proceeding slowly. VIctor Gtan NRC commissioner between
1984, say~ that iD recent yean,
""""··-·- been a general feelml (at the
NRC) that safety matters aren't that 1mThe NRC. he Mal, "bas reduced

.

nuclear industry don't like tbe author·
had to ifve away to) state

..n. ,...........-t offtdall."

Tbe

pubncly bas aid tbat It is do-

an it can to msure that people would 1ae

evwmted safely durtng 1m emergency.
ot:ber scientists complaift
ev~<:uation plans are further flawed
neither tbe government 110r tbe
has educated people 00

a nuclear acctde'lt.

gency, sirens would sound, buses would "Yoo
communicate that J!:md
ron. pollee would monitor
b:lte~ of mtormatloo untl1 there's a real emer"
stmoo Goren, a professor of
Uoas. bospttals would be
otber
dlenrdei.J
at tbe Univemty of
~ reqmrements would be met
'l'ldDg m Emerceaty•
NW'III'Iri'lv served 00 I bmeBut "If you drill iD ~. It mlijf be the
that.stuttled tbe new
wrone thlng iD a real emereency."
Is reieued from a
Nornum Rasmusson, a pbystctst
''T'IM NRC lll't
Massacllu.st>tts Institute of Teclmoloo. 11the ~tala
deed, "It mtgbt be better just to ~
non-nucJ@u scientist lite mywhere you are," says Edwald Webster. a
"The com.mlsskln needs to
pbys!cia.n who also teaches radiation
lnfctMmtUoo for the layman ud
tection at Harvard Uruvemty. .
tt Into tbe publk'l bands. 'l"bat'l
Tbat's beca.Wie whlle evacuatkm
to avoid pete dw"'DD u
Bini assumes tbat all nuclear accldftltll

'WrOnr

•

are the same. real emergencies eouJd

wid'ely In terms of wb&t ll:md of

I

reJta.sed. bow fast a.nd mwb&t ~
''Instead ot CODCeDtrating oo can we

u.ata. we sbould be~ oo
and; tf," evacuab sboWd
R1clwd W'Usoo, a, pbyskist It ~fil""!!!M
UllWersity. Be say~ evacuatioo plaillDI!!I'I
. , .'t IIUfftdently t:ra.IMd to

dllt.tnguJ.shtnJ ebaracte~ of u
cBl and woo.ldD't !mow bow best to ,.
IP$d Ill u emerp~Dcy.
- these ~ say that Iince
tloa. pideHDes were formulated by
eral govel'lUl'leDt alter 'i"!aree K1le
new scienttftc evidence bu shown

danCer ol ra.dtatkla beyood tbree
mU.. rrom a plant 1s lea me
tboqtlt. ld a result. the

bavq I to-mile
m~ It buder to

evacuate tbcee ~ . 'Wd:kiD

dae plant wbo are In the greatest

.

~·

w

ii

t -

of the major W'W·
industry."

mme nuclear power
A.'

II I

10

.47
paragraph, unless the Commission
rmines. among other things that
proposed facility meets the reements of paragraph (a)(l) of this
,on.
1<1 l Peak cladding temperature.

calculated maximum fuel element
ding temperature shall not exceed
•"F.
' Maximum cladding oxidation.

calculated total oxidation of the
ding shall nowhere exceed 0.17
s the total cladding thickness
re oxidation. As used In this subgraph total oxidation means the
l thickness of cladding metal that
ld be locally converted to oxide i1
he oxygen absorbed by and react'ith the cladding locally were coned to stoichiometric zirconium die. If cladding rupture is calculated
.ccur, the inside surfaces of the
ding shall be included in the oxim, beginning at the calculated
of rupture. Cladding thickness
re oxidation means the radial dise from inside to outside the clad. after any calculated rupture or
ling has occurred but before sigant oxidation. Where the calculatmditlons of transient pressure and
Jerature lead to a prediction of
.ling
with or without
rupture, the unoxidized cladshall be defined as the
.ling cross-sectional
taken at
rizontal plane at the
of
it
or at the

I 0-1~85

<5> Long-term cooling. After any cal·
culated successful initial operation of
the ECCS, the calculated core temperature shaH be maintained at an acceptably low value and decay heat
shall be removed for the extended
period of time required by the longlived radioactivity remaining in the
core.
<c> As used In this section: <1> Lossof-coolant accidents CLOCA's) are
pathetical accidents that would
from the loss of reactor coolant, at a
rate in excess of the capability of the
reactor coolant makeup system, from
breaks in pipes in the reactor coolant
pressure boundary up to and including
a break equivalent in size to the
double-ended rupture of the largest
pipe in the reactor coolant system.
<2> An evaluation model is the calculational framework for evaluating the
behavior of the reactor system during
a. postulated loss-of-coolant accident
<LOCA>. It includes one or more computer programs and all other information necessary for application of the
calculational framework to a specific
LOCA, such as mathematical models
used, assumptions included in the pro·
grams, procedure for treating the pro·
gram input and output information,
specification of those portions o.f anal"
ysis not included in computer provalues of parameters, and all
other
necessary to specify
the calculational procedure.
The reauirements
section

AOO

NRC that there is reasonable assur-

ance that
ures can and
of a
<2> The
will
finding on
a review of the Federal
<FEMA>
and
as to whether
State and local emergency
are
adequate and whether there reason·
able assurance that
can be impleassessment
mented, and on the
as to whether the applicant's onslte
plans are adequate and
is reasonable assurance
that they can be implemented. A
FEMA finding will primarily be based
on a review of the plans. Any other Information already available to FEMA
may be considered in assessing whether there is reasonable assurance that
the plans can be implemented. In any
NRC licensing proceeding, a FEMA
finding will constitute a rebuttable
presumption on questions of adequacy
and implementation
EIDerpreparedness exercises
(b)<l4) of this section
Section F of this
the operational innr£lee:ss and are not :required
licensing decision.
onsite an
paragraph (d)
site emergency response
clear power
standard&:

.......

Arrangements for requesting an•
effectively using assistance resource.
have been made, arrangements to ac
commodate State and local staff at th•
licensee's near-site Emergency Oper
atlons I<'acility have been made, am
other organizations capable of aug
menting the planned :response hav1
identified.
A standard emergency classifica
and action level scheme, the base:
of which include facility system a.nc
effluent parameters, is in use by tht
nuclear facility licensee, and State anc
local response plans call for relianct
on Information provided by facility li
censees for determinations of mini
mum initial offsite response measures.
ocedures have been established
for notification. by the licensee, oJ
State and local. response organization~
and for notification of emergency per·
sonnel by all organizations; the con·
tent of initial and followup messages
to response organizations and tht
public has been established; and
means to provide early notification
and clear instruction to the populace
within the plume
pathway
Planning
have been
comProvisions exist for
munications among
response
organizations to emergency personnel
>the pubU<
Information is made available to

llii

oo~w

10

§ 50.48

I

~ A range of protective actions
have been developed for the plume exposure pathway EPZ for emergency
workers and the public. Guidelines for
the choice of proteetive actions during
an emergeney, consistent with Federal
guidance, are developed and in place,
and protective actions for the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ appropriatti_o the locale have been developed.
(l.VI Means for controllmg radwlogtcal exposures. in an emergency, are established for emergency workers. The
means for controlling radiological exposures shall include exposure guidelines consistent with EPA Emergency
Worker and Lifesaving Activity Prote~·e Action Guides.
Arrangments are made for medica services for contaminated injured

exact
EPZs

ind~duals.

((La) General plans for recovery and
are developed.
1 Periodic exercises are <will bel
con ucted to evaluate major portions
of emergency response capabilities,
periodic drills are <will bel conducted
to develop and maintain key skills, and
deficiencies identified as a result of exer~s or drills are <will bel corrected.
~
Radiological emergency response training is provided to those
who may be called on to assist in an
re~ry

e~ency.

(!jil Responsibilities for plan development and review and for distribution of emergency plans are established, and planners are properly
trained.
<c>O) Failure to meet the applicable
standards set forth in paragraph <bl of
this section may result in the Commission declining to issue an operating license; however. the applicant will have
an opportunity to demonstrate to the
satisfaction of the Commission that
deficiencies in the plans are not significant for the plant in question. that
adequate interim compensating actions have been or will be taken
promptly, or that there are other compelling reasons to permit plant operation.
<2) Generally, the plume exposure
pathway EPZ for nuclear power plants
shall consist of an area about 10 miles
( 16 kmJ in radius and the ingestion
pathway EPZ shall consist of an area
about 50 miles <80 kmJ in radius. The

§

50.ig

Fire

onltl~·ctij:m.

<aJ Each
plant shall have
that satisfies
A to this
plan shall

430

10 CfR Ct.. I (1-1•85 Edition)
in this appf!ndix, an applia newly
will
in a
to
the
balance sheets and income
sta.teJ:nents reflecting the results of prior opap]pw~arlL should, however. !navvu""""u a statement of its
structure as of

APPENDIX D-[RESERVED]

APPEl!fDIX E-EMERGENCY PLANNING AND
PREPAREDNESS FOR PRODUCTION AND
ILIZA~riC>N FACILITIES

power reactors and the degree to which
compliance with the requirements of this
section and sections II. III. IV. and V as neewill be determined on a case-by-case
Notwithstanding the above paragraphs, in
the case of an operating license authorizing
only fuel loading and/or low power operations up to 5% of rated power, no NRC or
FEMA review, findings, or determinations
concerning the state of offsite emergency
preparedness or the atlequacy of and the capability to implement State and local offsite
emergency plans, as defined in this Appendix, are required prior to the issuance of
such a license.
II. THE PltEt.IMl'NARY SAFETY ANALYSIS
REPORT

Table of Contents
L Introduction

I. INTRODUCTION

apJpm,a!Jtl: for a construction permit
50.34<a> to include in the
analysis report a dtscus~~~~r;~n~~;.u~~~~J~~p~l.~an~~snf~•Or
with
e
forcoping
an operat§ 50.34tb> to inanalysts report

pot;eni•tal r!I.(Uologtcal hazards to the
operation of rerf!!u~t.ors and fuel facilities ll50 and 70 lncm~"'i'ti"J'atlor•"' Alff•'""''"'t than those asreactors. ConseEm.erg·en<:y Planning
than

Nuclear Regulatory (

The Preliminary Safety Analysts Report
shall contain sufficient information to
ensure the compatibility of proposed emergency plans for both onsite areas and the
EPZs, with facility design features, site
layout, and site location with respect to
such consirlerations as access routes, surrounding population distributions, land use.
and local jurtsdictional . boundaries for the
.EPZs in the case of nuclear power reactors
as well as·the means by which the standards
of§ 50.47Cbl will be met.
As a· minimum, the following items shall
be described:
A. Onsite and offsite organizations for
coping with emergencies -and the means for
notification, in the event of an emergency,
of pel'sons. assigned to the emergency organizations.
"B. Contacts and arrangements mane and
documented with local, State, and Federal
governmental agencies with responsibility
for coping with emergencies. including !den·
tiflcatlon otthe principal agencies.
C. Protective measures to be taken within
the site boundary and within each EPZ to
protect health .and safety in the event of an
.socident; procedures by ·Which these meas·
ures are to be carried out <e.g., tn the case of
an evacuation, who authorizes the eva.cu·
ation, how the ,public Is to be notified and
Instructed. how the evacuation ts to be car·
cooled 'nu.cl-ea:r 'r-ea:ctors and for reactors
with an authorized power level less than 250
MW thermal. GenerallY. the plume expo·
sure pathwa-y EPZ for nuclear power plants
with an authorized power level greater than
250 MW thermal shall consist of an area
about 10 miles (1:6 km) in radius and the in·
gestton pathway EPZ shall consist cif an
area about 50 miles <80 km> in rani us.
•Regulatory Guide 2.6 will be used as
guidance for the acceptability of research
and test reactor emergency response plans.

480

to be n:
treatment at offsite fac:
injured as a result of lice
tr
F. Provisions for
employees of the licens
who are
specifi
sponsibility
the even
and for other persons w
et>s of the licensee but w:
be needed in the even
emergency.
G. A preliminary ana
the time and means to l
notification of State am:
and the public in the ev
ey. A nuclear
pll
perform a
a.
ff'QUired to evacuate
tances within the
EPZ for transient
tions. noting major
'"'"u"u1.uu or taking
A

need to include
methods for
ousness and vucerttu~l
consequences of eme:
within and outside the
eluding
fox
using
meteorol
and for dispatch of radic
teams within the EPZs;
analysis
the 1
technical
center
site
operation
recomn
disseminatil::

to
tion among
the ""'""~'"'"·
plans submitted m
scrmt.:inn of the ea:m:ewc;s
IV
the
'EPZs} to an
strate that the
surance that aa·~qlJai,e

report a dtscWIfor coping with
.,."'''""'"''o.rmllcant for an operatby 50.34<b> to inle m the final safety
report
u; for coping with emergencies.
hill appendix establishes minimum re~ements for emergency plans for use In
Lining an a.cceptable state of emergency
pa.redness. These plans shall be debed generally in the preliminary safety
lysis report and submitted as part of the
J safety ana.lysll! report.
he potential radiological hazards to the
•lie associated with the operation of rerch and test reactors and fuel facilities Used under 10 CFR Pa.rts 50 and 70 in;e consideratlollll different than those aa,ated with nuclear power reactors. Consently, the size of Emergency Planning
•es • <EPZs> for facilities other than
""'llUY'>""

prE!llnlin;II.I'Y

li!PZs for power reactors are discussed in
REG-0396; EPA 520/1-78-016, "Planning
.is for the Development of State and
al Government Radiological Emergency
.ponse Plans in Support of Light Water
;lear Power Plants," December 1978. The
·, of the EPZs for a nuclear power plant
II be determined in relation to local
;rgency response needs and capabilities
Lhey are affected by such condltlo1111 as
.10graphy, topography, land characteris. a.ccess routes, and jurlsdictiona.l bound:s. The size of the EPZs also may be denlned on a case-by-case basis for gas-

u wen u the means
of II 50.4'Ub) will be
As a minimum, the

Items shall

be described:
A. Onslte and offsite orga.nlzations for
coping with emergencies and the means for
notification, in the event of an emergency,
of persons a.s.signed to the emergency organizations.
B. Cc:mta.cts and arrangements made and
documented with local, State, and Federal
governmental agencies with responsibility
for coping with emergencies, including Identification of the principal agencies.
C. Protective measures to be taken within
the site boundary and within each EPZ to
protect health and safety in the event of an
accident; procedures by which these measures are to be carried out (e.g., in the case of
an evacuation, who authorizes the evacuation, how the public is to be notified and
instructed, how the evacuation is to be carcooled nuclear reactors and for reactors
with an authorized power level less than 250
MW thermal. Generally, the plume exposure pathway EPZ for nuclear power plants
with an authorized power level greater than
250 MW thermal shall consist of an area
about 10 miles <16 kml In radiWI and the Ingestion pathway EPZ shall consist of an
area about 50 miles (80 km) In radius.
• Regulatory Guide 2.6 will be used as
guidance for the acceptablllty of research
and test reactor emergency response plans.

methods
ousneas and j,.I(Jtentlal scope
of emergency
within
outside the site boundary, including capabilities for dose projection
using real-time meteorological Information
and for dispatch of ra.dlologlcal monitoring
teams within the EPZs; and a preliminary
analysis reflecting the role of the onslte
technical support center and of the nearsite emergency operat1o1111 facility In assessing information, recommending protective
action, and disseminating information to
the public.
III. THE FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT

The Final Safety Analysis Report shall
contain the plans for coping with emergen·
cies. The plans shall be an expression of the
overall concept of operation; they shall describe the easentlal elements of advance
planning that have been considered and the
provisions that have been made to cope with
emergency situations. The Plans shall Incorporate information about the emergency response roles of supporting organizations and
offsite agencies. That information shall be
sufficient to provide assurance of coordination among the supporting groups and with
the licensee.
The plans submitted must Include a description of the elements set out ln Section
IV for the Emergency Planning Zones
<EPZsJ to an extent sufficient to demonstrate that the plans provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures

480

The organization for

•

•

rarllnlna_

censee's emergency organization and the
means for notification of such individuals In
the event of an emergency. Specifically, the
following shall be included:
l. A description of the normal plant oper-ating organization.
2. A description of the onsite emergency
response organization with a detailed discussion of:
a. Authorities, responsibilities, and duties
of the indlvldual<sl who will take charge
during an emergency;
b. Plant staff emergency assignments;
c. Authorities, responslbillties, and duties
on an onslte emergency coordinator who
shall be In charge of the exchange of information with offs!te authorities responsible
for coordinating and implementing offslte
emergency measures.
3. A description, by position and function
to be performed, of the licensee's headquarters personnel who will be sent to the plant
site to augment the onsite emergency organization.
4. Identification, by position and function
to be performed, of persons within the licensee organization who will be responsible
for making offsite dose projections, and a
description of how these projections will be
made and the results transmitted to State
and local authorities, NRC, and other appropriate governmental entities.

481

•

with

leal e:mer""""ies shall
described,
of authorities, responsibilities,
duties of Individuals a.s.signed to the li-

u1

>.

I!

Identification, by position and function

be perfonned. of other employees of the

ensee with special qualifications for
ping with emergency conditions that may
i.se. Other persons with special qua.lifica>ns, such as consultants, who are not emoyees of the licensee and who may be
lied upon for assistance for emergencies
all also be identified. The special qua.llfitions of these persons shall be described.
6. A description of t~e local offsite serv~ to be provided in support of the licens's emergency organiza,tlon.
7. Identification of. and assistance expect! from, appropriate State, local. and Federagencies with responsibilities for coping
•th emergencies.
8. Identification of the State and/or local
flcials responsible for planning for, orderg. and controlling appropriate protective
:Uons, including evacuations when neces.ry.

B. Assessment Actions
The means to be used for detennining the
.agnltude of and for continually assessing
1e Impact of the release of radioactive ma·rlals shall be described, including emer~ncy action levels that are to be used as
·iteria for detenninlng the need for notifi·
•tion and participation of local and State
Jencies, the Commission, and other Feder! agencies, and the emergency action levels
1at are to be used for detenninln& when
nd what type of protective measures
1ould be considered within and outside the
te boundary to protect health and safety.
he emergency action levels shall be based
n in-plant conditions and instrumentation
, addition to onsite and offsite monitoring.
'hese emergency action levels shall be dis·
.lli&ed and agreed on by the applicant and
tate and local governmental authorities
nd approved by NRC. They shall also be
~viewed with the State and local govemlental authorities on an annual basis.
C. Activation of Emergency Organization

10 Cfl Ch. I
shall Include: <ll notification of unusual
events, (2) alert, <3> site area emergency,
and <4> general emergency. These classes
are further discussed In NUREG-0654;
FEMA-REP-1.
D. Notification Procedures

1. Admlntstrative and physical means for
notifying local, State, and Federal officials

and agencies and agreements reached with
these officials and agencies for the prompt
notification of the public and for public
evacuation or other protective measures,
should they become necessary, shall be described. This description shall include Identification of the appropriate officials, by
title and agency, of the State and local government agencies within the EPZs. •
2. Provisions shall be described for yearly
dissemination to the public within the
plume exposure pathway EPZ of basic emergency planning information, such as the
methods and times required for public notification and the protective actions planned
If an accident occurs, general infonnation as
to the nature and effects of radiation, and a
listing of local broadcast stations that will
be used for dissemination of information
durin& an emergency. Signs or other measures shall also be used to disseminate to any
transient population within the plume exposure pathway EPZ appropriate lnfonnatlon
that would be helpful if an accident occurs.
3. A licensee shall have the capability to
notify responsible State and local governmental agencies within 15 minutes after declaring an emergency. The licensee shall
demonstrate that the State/local officials
have the capability to make a public notlfi·
cation decision promptly on being lnfonned
by the licensee of an emergency condition.
By February l, 1982, each nuclear power reactor licensee shall demonstrate that administrative and physical means have been established fm: alerting and providing prompt
instructions to the public within the plume
EPZ. The four-month
2> for the
deficiencies shall
installation
thill
that ill ,...,..,.j.,.,.r~

Quiring. urgent actlonl to the more likely
events where there Is substantial time available for the State and local governmental
officials to make a judgment whether or not
to activate the public notification system.
Where there is a decision to acUvate the notification system, the State and local officials will determine whether to activate the
entire notification system simultaneously or
in a graduated or staged manner. The responsibility for activating such a public notification system shall remain with the appropriate governmental authorities.
E. Emergency Facilities and Equipment

near-site emergency
facility;
among the nuclear
the prim
State and local emergency operations
ters, and the field assessment teams. ~
communications systems shall be tested
nually.
d. Provtslons for communications by
licensee with NRC Headquarters and
appropriate NRC Regional Office 0
atlons Center from the nuclear power 1
tor control room, the onslte technical
port center. and the near-site emergenc~
eratlons facility. Such communications s
be tested monthly.

Adequate provisions shall be made and described for emergency facilities and equipment, including:
1. Equipment at the site for personnel
monitoring;
2. Equipment for detennining the magnitude of and for continuously assessing the
impact of the release of radioactive materials to the environment;
3. Facilities and supplies at the site for decontamination of onslte Individuals;
4. Facilities and medical supplies at the
site for appropriate emergency first aid
treatment;
5. Arrangements for the services of physicians and other medical personnel qualified
to handle radiation emergencies on-site;
6. Arrangements for transportation of
contaminated injured individuals from the
site to specifically Identified treatment facilities outside the site boundary;
7. Arrangements for treatment of individuals injured in support of licensed activities
on the site .at treatment facilities outside
the site boundary;
8. A licensee onsite technical support
center and a licensee near-site emergency
operations facility from which effective direction can be given and effective control
can be exercised during an emergency;
9. At least one onslte and one oftsite communications system; each system allall have
a bacl!;up power source.
AU communication plans shi!JI
rangements for emergencies,

The program to provide for (1) the tr
ing of employees and exerctsing, by peri
drills, of radiation emergency plans
ensure that employees of the licensee
iamillar with their specific emergency
sponse duties, and (2) the participatiOI
the training and drills by other pen
whose asststance may be needed in
event of a radiation emergency shall be
scribed. This shall include a descriptiO!
specialized Initial training and periodic
training programs to be provided to eacl
the following categories of emergency
sonnel:
a. Dtrectors and/or coordinators of
plant emergency organization;
b. Personnel responsible for accident
sessment, Including control room shift
sonnel;
c. Radiological monitoring teams;
d. Fire control teams (fire brigades);
e. Repair and damage control teams;
f. First aid and rescue teams;
g. Medical support peroonnel;
h. Licensee's headquarters support
sonnel;
l. Security personnel.
In addition, a rawological oriental
training
shall be made avallabl
local
local emer1
Defense,
law enfo
personnel, local news media
describe

F. Tratning.

State and
partici-

a
32, are

1,
in

preparedness
on a biencl f•-•'"''"•"'" The level of participation
all be as
a) A State shall at least partially particite in each offslte exercise at each site.
bl A State shall fully participate in at
.st one offslte exercise every 2 years.
cl At least once every 7 years, all States
thin the plume exposure pathway EPZ
· a given site must fully participate In an
!site exercise for that site. This exercise
lSt also Involve full participation by local
vernments within the plume exposure
thway EPZ.
d) Partial participation by a local govem'nt during an offsite exercise for a site is
~eptable only when the local government
fully participating In a biennial exercise
another site.
Ke part In testing their Integrated capabll, to adequately access and respond to an
cident at a commercial nuclear power
ant. "Full participation" Includes testing
e major observable portions of the onslte
,d offsite emergency plans and moblllzam of State, local and licensee personnel
,d other resources In sufficient mumbers
vertfy the capability to respond to the acjent scenario.
• "Partial participation" when used In connction with emergency preparedness exer.es for a particular site means appropriate
fsite authorities shall actively take part in
e exercise sufficient to test direction and
ntrol functions; Le .. <a> protective action
·cision making related to emergency action
vels, and <b> communication capabilities
nong affected State and local authorities
1d the licensee.

5. All training, including exercises,
for formal critiques in order to !denweak or deficient areas that need coron. Any weaknelllles or deficiencies that
are Identified shall be corrected.
G. Maintaining Emergency Preparedness

Provisions to be employed to ensure that
the emergency plan, its Implementing procedures, and emergency equipment and supplies are maintained up to date shall be described.
H. Recover)!

Criteria to be used to determine when. following an accident, reentry of the facility
would be appropriate or when operation
could be resumed shall be described.
V. blPLE.VENTlNG PROCEDURES
No less than 180 days prior to the scheduled issuance of an operating license for a
nuclear power reactor or a license to possess
nuclear material one copy of the applicant's
detailed :mplementlng procedures for its
emergency plan shall be submitted to the
Administrator of the appropriate NRC Regional Office, specified In Appendix D of
Part 20 of this chapter and two copies are to
be sent to the Document Control Desk. U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555. Licensees who are authorized
to operate a nuclear power facility shall
submit one copy of any changes to the
emergency plan or procedures to the Administrator of the appropriate NRC Regional Office, specified in Appendix D. 10 CFR
Part 20, and two copies to the Document
Control Desk within 30 days of such
changes.
<Sees. 161b .. 1., and o., Pub. L. 83-703; 68
Stat. 948 <42 U.S.C. 2201>; sec. 201. as

of

be
produced
the prior 5
of this statement of
WIISteS Will

111 and
decommissioning
ln
with the Comradioactive wastes"
wastes resulting from mission's regulations, including the requirements set out ln this appendix.
the first cycle solvent ex6. With respect to fuel reprocessing plants
system. or equivalent, and the concentrated wastes from subsequent extrac- already licensed, the licenses will be appropriately conditioned to carry out the purtion cycles, or equivalent, In a facility for reposes of the policy stated above with respect
processing irradiated reactor fuels.) Highto high-level radioactive fission product
level liquid radioactive wastes shall be conwastes generated after iilStallation of new
verted to a dry solid as required to comply
equipment for interim storage of liquid
with this Inventory limitation, and placed in
wastes, or after installation of equipment
a sealed container prior to transfer to a Federal repository in a shipping cask meeting
required for solidification without Interim
the requirements of 10 CFR Part 71. The
liquid storage. In either case, such equipdry solid shall be chemically, thermally, and
ment shall be imtalled at the earliest practiradlolytically stable to the extent that the
cable date, taking into account the time reequilibrium pressure In the sealed container quired for design, procurement and installawill not exceed the safe operating pressure
tion thereof. With respect to such plants,
for that container during the period from
the application of the policy stated in this
canning through a minimum of 90 days
appendix to existing wastes and to wa.:;tes
after receipt <transfer of physical custody)
generated prior to the Installation of such
at the Federal repository. All of these highequipmem, will be the subject of a further
rule making proceeding.
level radioactive wastes shall be transferred
to a Federal repository no later than 10
<42
U.S.C. 2201, 2237; sec. 161, Pub. L. !l:J~
years following separation of fission prod703; 68 Stat. 948 <42 U.S.C. 2201); sec. 201,
ucts from the irradiated fuel. Upon receipt,
Pub. L. 93-438. 88 Stat. 1242, <42 U.S.C
the Federal repository will assume perma584lll
nent custody of these radioactive waste materials although industry will pay the Fed[35 FR 17533, Nov. 14, 1970. as amended at
eral Government a charge which together
36 FR 5411, Mar. 23, 1971; 42 FR 20139. Apr
with interest on unexpended balances will
18, 1977; 45 FR 14201, Mar. 5, 1980]
be designed to defray all costs of disposal
and perpetual surveillance, the Department
of Energy will take title to the radioactive
APPENDIX G-FRACTURE TOUGHNESS
waste material upon transfer to a Federal
REQUIREMENTS
repository. Before retirement of the reprocessing plant from operational status and
Table of Contents
before termination of licensing pursuant to
§ 50.82. transfer of all such wastes to a FedI. Introduction and Scope
eral repository shall be completed. Federal
II. Definitions
repositories, which will be limited in
III. Fracture Toughness Tests
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disposal or radioactive wastes,
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PART 238-cONTRACTS WITH
liNES

1 O:l

EFFECTIVE DATE:

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

and 238 of the

NaHonahly Act. as nmcnded
1228].

Jnes;

lization

tich
th the

Dated:

May 8. 1985.

2, 1985.

Andrew

C!mnichael, Jr .•
Associate Commissioner, Examinations
Immigration and Naturalization Sen·ice.
!FR Doc. 65-11126 Filed 5-7--85; 8:45am]

Plant Health Inspection

The
.nd

on page
26,

correction:
column, third
" between "7 CFR" and

Theresa W. Hajost, Attorney, Office of
the General Counsel. U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington.
D.C. 20555; Telephone: (202} 634-1493.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: in Union
of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 735 F.2d
1437 (D.C. Cir. 1984), the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit vacated the NRC's 1982
amendment (47 FR 30232, July 13. 1982}
to its emergency planning and
preparedness regulations. 10 CFR
50.47(a)(Z) (1984), which stated that
emergency preparedness exercises were
part of the operational inspection
process and thus were not required for
any initial licensing hearing or decision.
The court held that "Congress did not
grant the Commission discretion to
remove so material an issue as the
results of offsite emergency
preparedness from reqauired section
189(a) hearings." 735 F. 2d af1451. On
January 7, 1985, the Supreme Court
denied a petition for certiorari filed by
several Utility-Intervenors in the case.
and on January 30, 1985, the Court of
Appeals formally vacated the 1982
amendment.
The basic effect of the court's decision
and of the rule change which follows is
that the results of pre-licensing
emergency preparedness exercises may
be subject to litigation before the
Licensing Board. The revision does not
change the general predictive nature of
the Commission's findings on emergency
planning and preparedness issues.
Because the D.C. Circuit held that the
Commission did not have the statutory
authority to promulgate the 1982
amendment, it is unnecessary to provide
notice and an opportunity to comment
on this revision, which should be viewed
as an outgrowth of the 1982 rulemaking
proceeding. For the same reason the
Commission finds good cause for
making the revision effective on
publication in the Federal Register. The
revision is an administrative change to
conform the text of 10 CFR 50.47(a)(Z) to
the result in the case.
The court specifically focused on the
last sentence added to 10 CFR
50.47(a}(2) by the 1982 Amendment.
Thus, this sentence is being deleted from
10 CFR 50.47(a)(Z).
Paperwork Reduction Act Statement

ent
triction.

This revised rule contains no
information collection reuirements and
therefore is not subject to the
requirements of the PaperworL
Reduction Act of 19fl0 (44 U.S.C. 3501 e!
seq.].
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Environmental impact: Categorical
Exclusion
The NRC has determined that this
revised regulation is the type of action
described in categorical exclusion 10
CFR 51.2Z(c)(3). Therefore, neither an
environmental impact statement no1 an
environmental assessment has been
prepared for this revised regulation.
Moreover, when promulgating the
original emergency planning and
preparedness regulations in 1980, the
NRC prepared an "Environmental
Assessment for Final Changes to 10 CFR
Part 50 and Appendix E of 10 CFR Part
50. Emergency Planning Requirements
for Nuclear Power Plants" (NUREG-0685. June 1980). and concluded that
under the criteria of 10 CFR Part 51 an
environmental impact statement was
not required for the Commission's
emergency planning and preparedness
regulations, which included 10 CFR
50.47(a)(Z).as hereby revised.
List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 2

Antitrust. Classified information. Fire·
prevention. Incorporation by reference.
Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear
power plants and reactors, Penalty.
Radiation protection. Reactor siting
criteria, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.
For the reasons set out in the
preamble and under the authority of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974,
as amended, and section 553 of Title 5 of
the United States Code, the NRC is
adopting the following revisions to 10
CFR Par! 50.
PART so-DOMESTIC LICENSING OF
PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION
FACILITIES

1. The authority citation for Pari 50
continues to resd as follows:
Authority: Sees. 103, 104. 161, 182.. 183, 186.
189.68Sta!.936,937,948.953.954, 955,956, as
amended. sec. 234. 83 Stat. 1244. a& amended
{42 ll.S.C. 2133. 2134. 2201. 2232. 2233, 2236.
2Z39. 221l2); sees. 201, 202. 200. 68 Stnt. 1242.
1244. 1246, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5841. 5842.
5646). unless otherwise noted.
Section 50.7 also issued under Put.. L 95601, sec. 10. 92 Stat. 2951 (42 U.S.C. 5851).
Sections 50.57(d). 50.56. 50.91, and 50.92 also
issued under Pub. L 97-415. 96 Stat. 2071.
2073 (42 U.S.C. 2133, 2239]. Section 50.78 also
issued under sec. 122. 68 Stat 939 (42 ll.S.C.
2152). Sections 50.80-50.81 also issued under
sec. 184. 68 Stat. 954. as amended (42 U.S.C.
2234). Sections 50.1(){)-50.102 also issued
under sec. 186, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2236).
For the purposes of sec. 223. 68 Stat 958. II&
amended (42 U.S.C. 2273). §§ 5010 (a) (h).
and [c). 5044. 50.46. 50.48. 50.54. and 5C.BOii')
Me issued under sec. 161b, 68 Si~t 948. a~

\

19324

Federal Registe; / Vol. 50, No. 89 / Wednesday, May 8, 1985 / Rules and Regulations

amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(b)): §§ 50.10 (b) and
(c) and 50.54 are issued under sec. lOti. 68

Stat. 949, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(i)): and
§§ 50.55(e), 50.59(b), 50.70, 50.71, 50.72, 50.73,
and 50.78 are issued under sec. 161o, 68 Stat.
%0, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(o)).

2. In § 50.47, paragraph (a}(2) is
revised to read as follows:
§ 50.47 Emergency plans.
(a} * * *

(2) The NRC will base its finding on a
review of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency [FEMA) findings
and determinations as to whether State
and local emergency plans are adequate
and whether there is reasonable
assurance that they can be implemented,
and on the NRC assessment as to
whether the applicant's onsite
emergency plans are adequate and
whether there is reasonable assurance
that they can be implemented. A FEMA
finding wiil primarily be based on a
review of the plans. Any other
information already available to FEMA
may be considered in assessing whether
there is reasonable assurance that the
plans can be implemented. In any NRC
licensing proceeding, a FEMA finding
will constitute a rebuttable presumption
on questions of adequacy and
implementation capability.

.

. .

Dated at Washington, D.C., this 3rd day of
May 1985.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
John C. Hoyle,

Assistant Secretary of the Commission.
\

(FR Doc. 85-11162 Filed 5-7-85: 8:45am)
BILLIHG CODE 7590-01-M

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Comptroller of the Currency

•

12 CFR Part 7
[Docket No. 85-71

Charitable Foundations and Charitable
Contributions
AGENCY: Comptroller of the Currency,
Treasury.
ACTION: Final rule.

The Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency (Office) is rescinding its
interpretive rulings on charitable
foundations and charitable
contributions, 12 CFR 7.7445 and 7.7479,
respectively. Additionally. the Office is
clarifying that a national bank may
Pstablish Clifford trusts without seeking
pnor approval. This final rule is
i~t~nd~d to eliminate unnecessary
hn11tattons on a national bank's
charitable contributions.
SUMMARY:

EFFECTIVE DATI: fum~ 7, 191:!5.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Ford Barrett. Assistant Director.
Legislative and Regulatory Analysis
Division, Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, 490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW.,
Washington. D.C. 20219, (202) 447-1177.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background
Twelve U.S.C. 24 (Eighth) provides
that national banks may "contribute to
community funds or to charitable.
philanthropic, or benevolent
instrumentalities conducive to public
welfare." The Office interprets the
statute as authorizing national banks to
make charitable contributions and to
establish charitable foundations. The
statute does not limit charitable
contributions except as the "board of
directors may deem expedient and in
the interests of the association . . . ."
In 1957, the Office issued Interpretive
Ruling 7220 concerning the
establishment of charitable foundations.
The ruling limited contributions by the
bank to a charitable foundation to "the
amount permitted by federal law as a
deduction from income for the purpose
of the federal tax on corporate income."
In 1963, the ruling was renumbered as
Interpretive Ruling 7445, and in 1971, it
was codified at 12 CFR 7.7445 without
substantive change. In 1971, the Office
also issued the charitable contributions
ruling. 12 CFR 7.7479. The latter ruling
stated that a national bank's
contributions should "not exceed that
which is allowed by the Internal
Revenue Service as a deduction from
income."
In 1978, the Office amended both
interpretive rulings to include more
specific limitations on a national bank's
contributions to charity or to its
charitable foundation. As a result, since
1978 a national bank has been ll:mited to
contributing each half-year "five percent
of the sum of 'income before income
taxes and securities gains or losses' and
'Securities gains (losses). Gross'
registered during the preceding calendar
half-year." The Office imposed the five
percent limitation to "prevent
management of closely-held banks from
contributing excessive sums to charities
or foundations in which the bank's
controlling stockholders had a personal
interest." 43 FR 19831, 19832.
Following the 1978 amendments,
several banks have applied for
exemptions from the limitations on the
amount of their contributions to charity
and to foundations. The Office usually
approved these applications after
determining that the contributions were
consistrmt with safe Hnd sound banking

national
allowed as
a deduction
Internal Revenue
Code. If a bank exceeds
Code's
deductible amount, the
of
directors should
minutes. Such
1an:~m~.Re of 12

the
take into account
financial condition before "'"'"'"umox the
deductible
Use
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Assembly Committee on Utilities and Commerce
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANNING FOR
CALIFORNIA'S NUCLEAR POWERPLANTS
Wednesday, May 7, 1986
Sacramento, California

CHAIRWOMAN GWEN MOORE:

This informational hearing

responds to concerns raised by the severe accident at the
Chernobyl Nuclear Powerplant in Soviet, Ukraine.
The hearing will focus on emergency response planning,
the complex of activities that occurs once a severe accidents at
one of our nuclear powerplants has happened.
One of the striking and disturbing things about the
Russian accident was the obvious lack of a detailed emergency

I

response plan that was afforded the citizens, and the accurate
world information about the occurrence.

We will be looking into

what steps should be taken to protect the health of the public in
the immediate vicinity of a nuclear powerplant, and what steps
should be taken to protect the health of the public at a farther
distance from the accident scene.
The Russians clearly assumed that the design of their
plant was such that a severe accident involving extensive damage
to the core and large-scale release of radiation simply could not
occur.

Apparently, failing to thin about the unthinkable has not

paid off for the Russians.

Our system of nuclear regulation requires detailed
emergency response planning, which by definition means assuming
that the emergency will arise.

Emergency response planning

entails detailed cooperation between the utility, the state and
local governments.

It requires identifying health risks to the

general public and developing procedures for reducing or
eliminating them.

Most important, it requires instilling good

judgment in the persons who may be called upon to cope with the
consequences of severe accidents.
We will first hear witnesses from the Federal Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Federal Emergency Management
Administration (FEMA).
Welcome.

Please describe the emergency response plans

and what's required of the utilities.

There have been recent

comments coming from the NRC that some of the plants are
outdated.

You may want to consider those factors when you make

your presentation.
MR. DEAN KUNIHIRO:
Committee, I'm Dean Kunihiro.

Madam Chairperson and Members of the
I am State Liason Officer for the

Nuclear Regulator Commission's Region 5 office in Walnut Creek.
I am appearing before you today to provide you with a brief
overview of the regulations governing emergency preparedness at
the nuclear power facilities.
In August of 1980, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
upgraded its regulations in order to ensure that adequate

2

protective measures could be taken in the event of a radiological
emergency at one of these licensed facilities.

A copy of these

regulations have been included with my testimony today.

I'd like to highlight for you some of the major
provisions of the Commission's emergency preparedness
regulations.

The Commission has determined that no NRC operating

license for a nuclear powerplant will be issued unless the NRC
finds that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective
measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological
emergency.

The NRC bases its findings on (1)

an NRC assessments

as to whether the licensees on-site emergency plans are adequate
and whether there are capable of being implemented, and (2) on a
review of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA)
findings and determinations as to whether state and local
governments' off-site emergency plans are adequate and whether
I

there is reasonable assurance that they can be implemented.
The Commission's regulation extends emergency planning
considerations to two "Emergency Planning Zone."

I

One zone is

related to direct exposure to radiation while the other is
related to the exposure via the food chain.

The exact size and

configuration of these zones surrounding a given nuclear
powerplant is determined by such conditions as demography,
topography, land characteristics, access routes, and
jurisdictional boundaries.
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The final provision of the regulation is that which
identifies the standards that both on-site and o£f-site emergency
plans must meet. There are sixteen listed standards.

These

standards include a wide range of planning considerations that
needs to be addressed in utility, state and local emergency
response plans.

They include, among other things, assignment or

identification of primary emergency responsibilities, use of a
standard emergency classification scheme, establishment of
emergency notification procedure among organizations, as well as,
members of the general public, establishment and maintenance of
adequate emergency facilities and equipment, and provision for
training of emergency response personnel to include the conduct
of periodic emergency response exercises.
The inspection enforcement program to ensure compliance
with the Commission's regulations is implemented by the NRC's
Region 5 office.
To summarize, it is clear, based on the public record
compiled during the emergency preparedness rulemaking, that
on-site and off-site emergency preparedness, as well as, proper
siting and engineering design features are needed to protect the
health and safety of the public.

It is also clear from the

accident at Three Mile Island that the protection provided by
siting and engineering design features must be bolstered by the
ability to take protective measures during the course of an
accident.

The accident showed that on-site conditions and action

4

(even if they do not cause significant off-site radiological
consequences) would affect the way the various state and local
entities react to protect the public from any dangers associated
with an accident.

In order to discharge effective statutory

responsibilities, the Commission must be assured that proper
means and procedures will be in place to assess a course of an
accident and its potential severity.

•

The Commission must be

assured that the NRC, other appropriate authorities, and the
public will be notified property, and that adequate protective
measures in response to actual or anticipated conditions can and
will be taken.

The Commission's emergency preparedness

regulations were adopted to provide these necessary assurances.
Madam Chairwoman, that concludes my prepared remarks.
would be pleased to answer any questions the Committee may have
of me.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

•

for the public is the NRC is on-site and FEMA would be the
off-site kind of services.
on-site.

I

The one thing that I want to clarify

We have already heard from the

Let's hear from the off-site.
MR. NICK NIKAS:

Madam Chairwoman, I am Nick Nikas from

the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Region 9 with
offices in San Francisco.

As you indicated, our focus of

responsibility is an off-site emergency preparedness.

The

off-site emergency preparedness plans have been developed since
the Three Mile Island incident that Dean referred to in his

5
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testimony.

The plans are supported by the extensive network of

emergency response procedures, equipment and professional
expertise that could be brought to bear in the event of an
emergency at any nuclear powerplant in the state.
Outside the boundaries of the powerplant, state and
local governments have plans for addressing the effects of
radiation, including the indirect effects that could be
experienced through the contamination of the food chain.

To test

the viability of these plans, state and local governments are
required to demonstrate a biannual field exercise and their
ability to execute them.
At the federal level, the Federal Radiological Emergency
Response Plan provides for a coordinated response of federal
agencies to assist state and local governments, protect people
and the environment.

The Federal Response Plan was tested in a

major field exercise in 1984 and will be tested again in June of
1987.

powerplant has an alert and notification system that

must be capable of notifying the public residing within 10 miles
of the plant within 15 minutes after a decision to take a
protective action has been reached.

Sirens, tone alert radios,

and the emergency broadcast system are key ingredients of this
lity.

Other facilities and plan activities contribute to

off-site preparedness, including emergency operating centers,
radiation measuring services, agreements with medical facilities
and other nearby organizations that can contribute to quick and
effective responses.
6

To supplement the efforts of the utility, state and
local governments and the federal government can deploy emergency
response teams and an array of equipment to the scene of an
emergency anywhere in the United States within hours.

Through

various training programs, hundreds of emergency response
personnel from all levels of government and the utilities are
receiving continuous training in appropriate response procedures.
The following is a summary of what would happen in case of a
serious accident at a nuclear powerplant in the United States.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN TERESA HUGHES:
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

Question?

Ms. Hughes.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN HUGHES:

You said that the federal

government could provide emergency services within hours.
MR. NIKAS:

Yes.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN HUGHES:
What do you mean?

What could happen within hours?

Where does the emergency service come from?

Rancho Seco?
MR. NIKAS:

You're talking about the federal level now?

ASSEMBLYWOMAN HUGHES:
MR. NIKAS:

Yes.

This is assuming that the incident reaches

the proportions where the state and local governments ask for
federal assistance?
ASSEMBLYWOMAN HUGHES:

That's right.

For example, they

had a big blow up there, who makes the decision as to whether the
federal government should be called right away?

What is the

mechanism before the federal government will respond?
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CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

You might explain the state and local

governments have the first line of responsibility.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN HUGHES:

How severe does it have to be?

You said within a matter of hours the federal government would
respond.

It may take the state and local government hours to

decide they need federal intervention.

Explain to me the

mechanism before we get to that point.

Will we all still be here

while this bureaucracy is dealing with each other?
MR. NIKAS:

I can best do that by explaining how we in

Region 9 would react to an incident or an accident at one of the
plants in this state.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN HUGHES:

Thank you.

That's what I want to

hear.
MR. NIKAS:

Our planning, which is pretty much in place,

is being refined on a daily basis.

Our interaction with the NRC

and the state would allow us to know almost immediate that such
an incident had occurred.

This would alert the regional director

or a senior member of his staff to immediately begin to mobilize
the resources of the region and to muster staff.
Our plan provides for us to assemble all the time that
this intelligence is being developed and reported to us.

The

regional director probably within a matter of one or two hours,
depending on how long it took him to get from wherever he is to
his office, where we have an emergency operation center, whereby
he could evaluate the information that was provided to him.
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He

could decide to deploy an emergency response team which would be
comprised of people who are familiar with the kind of business we
are talking about.
the accident.

They would immediately move to the scene of

In Orange County, if it was at the San Onofre

plant, San Luis Obispo, we would immediate interact with the
state and local officials present, gain intelligent, learn as
much as we could about the nature of the incident.

That

information would be fed back to the regional director who would,
in all of this time, be in contact with the federal officials at
the national level.

By this time, he would be operating out of

an emergency information coordination center at our Washington
offices.

They are operational around the clock.

Depending upon

the nature of the incident, we could deploy resources from the
region, from the national level to wherever they are located to
the scene of the accident.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN HUGHES:
MR. NIKAS:

Region 9?

ASSEMBLYWOMAN HUGHES:
MR. NIKAS:

How large is the region?

Yes.

How large is Regional 9?

It's California, Arizona, Nevada, Hawaii and

the Pacific basin.
We could probably have people deploy on airplanes and to
the accident site within five or six hours.

This would depend in

large measure on the ability of other federal agencies that react
to FEMA's guidelines, because we are a coordinating agency to do
things that they are prepared to do.
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We have rehearsed and

continue to plan in the event of this type of accident.

I am

confident, based on our training and experience, we could deploy
a response to a serious accident within a matter of 10 hours.

We

are required at the the Region to be able to move into a federal
response center that would be activated and capable of operations
within 6 to 12 hours depending on how far it is from the Region,
or whether we have to fly, drive, etc.

That is our requirement,

and we can meet that requirement.
It would obviously take longer for resources from the
east coast to come out here, or from the Nevada test site, to
board on airplanes and move to the scene of the accident.

But,

the regional itself is required by our own federal regulations to
be prepared to move into a federal response center and be
operational within 6 to 12 hours.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE.
MR. NIKAS:
governments.

Do you conduct a biannual drill?

Biannual drills are done by local and state

They are for the purpose of testing their plans.

We tested our federal response plan in 1984, and will test it
again in 1987.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:
MR. NIKAS:
three years cycle.

Is that a three year occurrence?

I don't think it has been established on a
What happened is we began developing the

Federal Emergency Response Plan right after Three Mile Island.
We got a chance to look at the effectiveness of our response.

We

worked on this plan and decided in 1984 we were prepared to go on
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the street with it, so to speak.

We wanted to test it first.

found weaknesses in the Plan, obviously.
being corrected.

We

Those weaknesses are

We are working on improving the Plan.

We

expect to have it in condition to test it again in 1987.
There is also the problem of funding.
expensive proposition.

It is a very

We do it when we have the resources.

CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

Your biannual plan would require that

all the agencies involved go through the whole process?
MR. NIKAS:

Yes.

Absolutely.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN GLORIA MOLINA:
drill?

How do you score on that

In 1984, you had a certain test and evaluation that was

done on preparedness.
MR. NIKAS:

Of the federal plan, yes.

ASSEMBLY MOLINA:

What would have been the ultimate

score?
MR. NIKAS:

I don't know what the score was.

I don't

think there was a score.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA:
MR. NIKAS:

•

controllers.
have players.

The organization provided for evaluators and

It's a typical standard exercise scenario where you
You have a script.

have evaluators.
exercise.

How did you·evaluate it then?

You have controllers.

You

All of those people go into conducting an

There are certain standards that are prescribed in the

Nuclear Regulatory Commission and FEMA regulations.
certain things we must be able to do.
the basis of performance.
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There are

The evaluators judge on

ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA:
at.

That is what I'm trying to get

How did you score in 1984?
MR. NIKAS:

I don't know.

I don't have that information

with me.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA:

Who would have that information?

Aren't you the Region 9 representative?
MR. NIKAS:
Region 9.

The exercise itself was not conducted in

It was conducted at Saint Lucy, Florida.

information is available.

We could get it.

That

However, I don't

have it with me, because I never expected to have to answer that
question.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA:
concerns.

I think that would be one of our

There are certain procedures.

Region 9 has procedures

are are established and coordinated through local and state
government.

Everybody has a role they play with regard to any

kind of an emergency.
actually happens.

The real test is going to be when it

That is when the whole network will be able to

move and coordinate quick enough to meet the emergency.

I don't

know in any of the testing procedures that have ever been
produced whether anyone really met the whole goal of providing
for the full safety of everyone within an exposed area.

Even

though you go through the testing procedures, it is interesting
to know what evaluation was used.
MR. NIKAS:

I think I understand your question.
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ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA:

Ts there a state and local

government responsibility for the coordination not being met?.
Everybody is going to look to government to provide the safety.
That doesn't mean it is a federal responsibility, a state
responsibility, or a local responsibility.

Everybody is going to

look at just government to provide that kind of safety.

My

concern is as you do your evaluation, what was the test results?
This test was not done in our area, so how is it tested (i.e.,
Rancho Seco) in an emergency situation?
HR. NIKAS:

My comments were relative to the federal

emergency response plan.

I thought that was your question.

I

can answer your question if you will give me the opportunity.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA:
MR. NIKAS:

Sure.

In regards to testing the plans of the state

and local jurisdictions, those are the exercises conducted
biannually.

Those exercises are evaluated to determine whether

or not the plans are effective, valid, viable, and whether or not
in their execution indicates they will reasonably provide for the
protection and welfare of the residents living near the plant.
They are a matter of record.
evaluating agency initiate it.

The procedure is prescribed and the
The Federal Emergency Management

makes findings and gives them to the Nuclear Regulation
Commission who use those findings upon which to base their own
findings.

They make that determination if these plans are

adequate.

They also indicate from the basis of the performance

13

that the jurisdictions and utilities involved can, in fact,
protect and provide for the welfare of the residence around the
area.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA:

So, when was your last test for

Rancho Seco?
MR. NIKAS:

I don't know for sure.

CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

Just a minute.

We will hear from the utilities and

they can answer that question for you, Ms. Molina.
MR. NIKAS:

It was in 1984.

The next one is scheduled

in October.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA:

It's the federal government, in

my understanding, ultimate responsible, particularly in Region 9.
They prescribe to the state and local government in order to meet
all the standards that are set.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

The NRC establishes the standards,

both the on-site and off-site.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA:
Rancho Seco?
score?

When was the last evaluation for

If it has any kind of score level, where did it

What were the problems?
MR. NIKAS:

If I had known you were going to ask those

kinds of questions, I would have come prepared with the
documentation to try to answer them.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

Why don't you try to get that

information for the Committee?

14

MR. NIKAS:

I can tell you the information is available.

That was the reason the plant, at the time the test was done, was
allowed to continue to operate.

The local jurisdictions,

off-site, the stand plans and their demonstration showed that the
plans were adequate.

We then could reasonably conclude that in

the event of an accident, those jurisdictions could provide for
the safety and welfare of the people.

•

ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA:

I don't mean to be disrespectful •

However, when each of us look at any of these situation, we are
talking about public safety.
are many jurisdictions.

There are many regulations.

There

It would be nice if we could just turn

away from our constituents and say, "It is not my responsibility.
It is the federal or local responsibility."

However, the reality

is that each of us have a responsibility to provide safety.
do people know there is safety?

How

We can't just turn around and

say, "Region 9 is responsible for that or the utilities are
responsible for that."

It is hard to evaluate.

How can we

measure safety from any of these tests?
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

Ms. Molina, this may be helpful.

In

some extent, the state and others are preempted by what is set
forth by the NRC.
you may not.

In some instances where you may wish to help,

Maybe the NRC can clarify their role for us in

terms of the state's responsibility as it relates to standards.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA:
standards.

I'm not looking so much for

I'm saying standards are already there.

new standards every time they test.
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Right?

They develop

CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

No, wrong.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA:

You have already established all

of the ultimate standards for state and local government
response?
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

Right.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA:

Then, how did they test in the

last drill?
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:
bit.

Let me see if I can help you a little

What he is trying to get you to see is that those standards

are established in order to get your license to build a nuclear
powerplant.

You have to include as part of the package your

emergency response plan.

The NRC then evaluates that plan to see

if it meets all the criteria they have in terms of providing
safety.

You might tell us how you may change or update your

emergency response plan.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA:

Ms. Moore, what kind of safety

are we providing for the public?

What is our responsibility in

order to ensure that kind of safety?

We are talking about

nuclear powerplants that have been built with cost overruns.
They had tremendous plans and regulations, and look at the price
of what we are playing for them.

The issue is you can have fine

regulation, you can have fine reports, and you can present to us
all the jurisdictional roles everybody plays, but the question is
when was your last test?
be changed?

How well did you test?

How did we score?

What needs to

Those are the questions I'm

asking.
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Everybody can have rules and regulations, plans and
everything else.

The reason I ask the questions is because I

used to serve as deputy director for HEW (Health, Education and
Welfare Department) in Region 9.

We had a role we played.

know that in the last test, we were pretty miserable.

I

It was

never evaluated on the kinds of protections of what I think the
public is going to demand.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

Let's have the NRC enter back into

this discussion, because they are the guys your questions ought
to be directed to.

They set forth how all of this takes place.

Obviously, one of the concerns here is how do you update your
plan?
MR. KUNIHIRO:

The NRC is responsible for making an

evaluation about the utilities ability to respond to an
emergency, both in the evaluation list plans and the evaluation
of their ability to respond to those plans.

•

The NRC looks to

FEMA to make that similiar evaluation for state and local
governments.

In doing so, FEMA renders a report to the NRC.

Ms.

Molina, you asked what the score was for the most recent Rancho
Seco exercise.

There are no scores per se.

There are no

numerical value scores as we would have a score on an exam for
example.

On the other hand, the results of the exercise

evaluation are documents, and I'm sure FEMA would be happy to
provide you with a copy of the most recent Rancho Seco report.

17

In that report, to my recollection, FEMA concluded that
the plans and preparedness as it relates to the off-site at
Rancho Seco, were adequate in order to protect public health and
safety.

They did find, in the course of their evaluation,

certain problem areas, and identified those problems in the
report.

FEMA looks to the state and local government to make

changes and fix the problem areas as were identified.

Again, the

point I'm making is there is no quantitative score as a result of
those evaluations.

There is a report rendered.

I believe FEMA

would be most pleased to provide you with a copy of the most
recent Rancho Seco report.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA:

So, the accountability lies

where?
MR. KUNIHIRO:

The accountability lies at the state and

local government level for the protection of public health and
safety, and to make those decisions necessary for the protection
of the public health and safety.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:
MR. KUNIHIRO:

Could we legislate in that area?

I am not an expert on preemption matters.

It is my belief that the state has, in fact, legislated in that
particular area, and can do additional things that is deemed
necessary.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

Mr. Sher?

ASSEMBLYMAN BRYON SHER:

Are you telling us that the

State Legislature could enact an emergency response requirement,
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and that the sanction, if its not being implement, would be the
plant would have to close down until that was in place?

Does the

state have that kind of power or has that been preempted by the
federal government?
MR. KUNIHIRO:

I am not a preemption expert.

ASSEMBLYMAN SHER:

You would welcome the state

constructing an emergency response requirement?

•

Would you feel

confident that you could meet it?
MR. KUNIHIRO?:

No, that is not what I'm saying.

ASSEMBLYMAN SHER:
Madam Chair.

I'm not sure we have that power,

We share the concern, but we don't have the power.

CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

There are also some concerns you

don't think it is important consider Diablo being built on a
fault.

You being the NRC.

Would state government have any

authority to go back and revisit and take a look at Diablo?

The

people of the State of California would have a real concern with

I

Diablo sitting on an earthquake fault.
MR. KUNIHIRO:
Madam Chairwoman.

I

If I might correct that last statement,

The NRC considers it extremely important that

a plant may be prone to earthquakes.

It was the NRC's

determination that additional safety features be built into the
facility, and that was done.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

It is okay to build on a fault as

long as you include additional safety features which you say the
evaluation process is somewhat questionable.
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You're also saying

that you approved the plant being on a fault since they took the
additional safety precautions.
MR. KUNIHIRO:

The plant was built to withstand the most

incredible earthquake in that particular area.

That was the

finding of the NRC.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:
MR. KUNIHIRO:

I won't even go into how do you know.

The plant was built to extraordinary

standards that are not normally applied to the plants not built
in the proximity of earthquake faults.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

Or, built directly on a fault.

there other questions of FEMA or FERC?
ASSEMBLYMAN DAN HAUSER:

Are

Mr. Hauser?

I just have one basis question.

Both state and federal governments are substantially in a cutback
mode right now as far as funding is concerned.

Do the proposed

cuts have a detrimental effect on either FEMA or the NRC in your
ability to carry out the safety functions?
MR. NIKAS:

I can respond for FEMA.

that will not be allowed to happen.

I can honestly say

As a matter of fact, a

specific effort is being made to ensure that all resources needed
by the federal emergency management regions to carry out their
responsibility of evaluating state and local exercises will be
made available.

We may suffer in other areas, but it is clear

that those resources will be made available to us.

Although we

may not be able to travel any place else, we will be coming to
Sacramento, San Luis Obispo, and Orange County to conduct the
exercises at those localities.
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MR. KUNIHIRO:

There have been similarly no reductions,

from the NRC's standpoint, impacting on its
inspection/enforcement program in the area of emergency response.
ASSEMBLYMAN HAUSER:
MR. NIKAS:

No, I don't.

MR. KUNIHIRO:

At this time, we do not envision any.

CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

•

You don't envision any?

Is there any attempt to go back and

maybe take a look, revisit, and update the plants, or is it only
done as you go through your biannual drills?

As new information

becomes available, is there some attempt to have them expand or
change their response plan by the NRC or FEMA?
MR. NIKAS:

Yes.

In regard to emergency planning, a

case in point is what happened immediately after Three Mile
Island.

There were standards and criteria for planning and

off-site preparedness.

Let me put it this way, we provided

guidance to the state and local jurisdictions for the development
of their off-site plans.

Immediately after Three Mile Island,

those criteria were changed.

They were much more stringent.

requirements increased dramatically.

I

The

I could say without fear of

contradiction if there is clear evidence that the standards as
they exist are inadequate, they would be changed to take those
requirements into account.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

You would have the authority to have

that done?
MR. NIKAS:

Yes.
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CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

I want to thank you, unless there are

some other questions of these witnesses.
ASSEMBLYMAN SHER:
MR. KUNIHIRO:

Are you the NRC representative?

Yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN SHER:

What about those facilities in the

United States that don't have double containments?
look at that?

Have you been

For example, those facilities like the Soviet

facilities is where weapons were made and not utilities.
something the NRC is looking at now?

Is that

Are there any of those in

California?
MR. KUNIHIRO:

There is one graphite moderate reactor, a

much small reactor which is not of the same design as the
Chernobyl reactor, in the State of California.
ASSEMBLYMAN SHER:

Without the containment wall or

barriers?
MR. KUNIHIRO:
particular

There is no containment at that

ility.

ASSEMBLYMAN SHER:

You care to tell us where that is

located?
MR. KUNIHIRO:

It is the G.E. facility at Vallecitos.

ASSEMBLYMAN SHER:
1

Is the NRC looking at those and in

of the Soviet accident, may impose further requirements?
MR. KUNIHIRO:

The NRC will make every effort to learn

from the Soviet accident.
any information.

However, at this time, we do not have

I think it is premature to speculate how that

accident might impact on any of the NRC's regulations.
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ASSEMBLYMAN SHER:
might lead to some changes?

You are trying to learn from it?

It

Particularly in so-called graphite

without the barrier walls or containment is under review at the
NRC now?
MR. KUNIHIRO:

The NRC has appointed a staff of its most

senior scientists to evaluate the Chernobyl accident to determine
what impacts that accident will have on regulatory changes.
ASSEMBLYMAN SHER:

Will that be a subject of a report to

the Commissioners or a hearing?
MR. KUNIHIRO:

Has that been determined?

That has not been determined yet.

CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

If there are changes, how would that

be handled?
MR. KUNIHIRO:

The changes would most likely come in the

form of rulemaking, and it would go through the normal NRC
rulemaking procedures.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

We thank you for your testimony, and

appreciate you taking the time to come down and talk to us.
MR. KUNIHIRO:

You're welcome.

CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

•

Our next panel will be the Sacramento

Municipal Utility District (SMUD), Southern California Edison,
and Pacific, Gas & Electric (PG&E).
In the essence of time, why don't we have each of you
make a brief opening statement?

Please identify yourselves and

the utility you are representing for the record.
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MR. STU WILSON:

Madam Chairwoman and Members of the

Committee, I am Stu Wilson representing SMUD (Sacramento
Municipal Utility District).

I have Robert Myers with me today.

I want to make a minor correction in your agenda.

Mr. Myers is

the Director of Emergency Planning.
ASSEMBLYMAN STEVE PEACE:

Rancho Seco never runs anyway.

How can anything happen to it?
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:
about that.

We will have to let them tell us

Mr. Peace is saying since Rancho Seco is always

down, we don't have to worry about an nuclear accident.
MR. ROBERT MYERS:

Madam Chairwoman and Members of the

Committee, my name is Robert Myers.

I am the Supervisor of

Emergency Preparedness for the Sacramento Municipal Utility
District (SMUD).

Rather than read the prepared testimony, I will

make a brief statement.
One of the major responsibilities of my job at SMUD is
to provide for coordination of the District Emergency Response
P

for Rancho Seco with jurisdictions over the counties of San

Joaquin, Sacramento, Amador and the State of California's
emergency response plan.

We have, in the past several years,

held joint exercises with the three counties and the state.
have been evaluated by the federal government.
we had an exercise with the utility alone.
exercises have changed at the federal level.
exercise biannually.

They

This past year,

The rule for
They needed only to

We have an exercise scheduled in early fall
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or October 8th of this year.

It is going to be an extensive

exercise to thoroughly exercise the plans of all three
jurisdictions and the utility.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

Let's hear from PG&E (Pacific, Gas

and Electric Company) •
MR. JIM SHEPHERD:
Shepherd.

•

Good afternoon, my name is Jim

I'm Vice President of Nuclear Power Generation for

PG&E (Pacific, Gas and Electric Company).

On my left, I have

with me Warren Fujimoto who is the Supervising Engineer in my
department.

He is responsible for emergency planning.

On my

right is Bruce Norton, licensing attorney retained by PG&E.
We prepared a brief written statement which we will pass
out to the Committee.

I would like to make a few remarks by way

of summary, and then answer any questions you may have.
At the outset, we have been following the news of the
unfortunate accident at Chernobyl.

•

I can assure you that as more

information comes available, we expect to be working with others
and gaining any lessons learn from this experience.

I can also

assure you that PG&E is first and foremost committed to safety of

•

those people who work at Diablo Canyon and live in the
surrounding community.
Assurance of safety requires a multi-facet approach.
the nuclear industry, we call that "defense in depth."

In

It starts

with a sound and thorough review of plant design to guarantee the
health and safety of the public and the workers at the
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powerplant..

It is really a three phrase process.

It requires a

thorough and well design plant with the first criteria being
safety.

The plant requires a well training plant staff and

comprehensive support organization.

In addition, it requires

thorough emergency planning, which of course, what we are here to
ta

about today.
We begin our emergency planning efforts for Diablo

Canyon in 1973.

Throughout this process, we worked very closely

with state and local officials; not only in the development of
our plans, but in the development of their plans.

As we sit here

today, I can tell you we have a series of comprehensive
compatible plans for not only Diablo Canyon, but also the local
agencies in that area.
that is an

ex~emely

It has been a cooperative effort, and

important factor.

We know their people and

they know our people.

We have built up an atmosphere of mutual

confidence and trust.

As you know, this enables us to work well

as a team in the exercises we have had.
As you also know, teamwork is probably the most
important single factor in managing an emergency.
several key elements with the plan.

There are

We have provided extensive

emergency facilities, both at the plant site and off-site.
One feature of our plant is we have an emergency
facility located off-site, near the Sheriff's office in San Luis
Obispo County.

That is used by both the county and PG&E for

coordinated emergency efforts.

One thing that is significant
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about that particular facility is it was activated last year by
the county as part of an effort to fight those devastating fires
that occurred in the San Luis Obispo area.

The emergency workers

from the county who utilized that facility said it was a very key
element in their overall ability to respond to that emergency.
We, like the other powerplants, have spent a good deal
of time in the area of public information in the event of an
emergency.

We, of course, have procedures for notifying a county

agency in the first fifteen minutes after an accident.

We have

installed an emergency warning system consisting of 129 sirens
that blankets the emergency planning zone out to about 20 miles
from the plant.

Thirteen (13) radio stations are coordinated to

gather an emergency broadcast system in the San Luis Obispo area.
Our emergency plan calls for the formation of our
extensive media center, which is physically located right next to
the emergency operation center.

I

general location.

We have everything all in the

We, like other plants, have made extensive

provisions for primarily assessment for radiological conditions.
We are a network of implant radiation monitors and fixed monitors

I

out in the environment that transmits into the emergency
operation center (the central command post).
teams available.

We have emergency

These teams, by the way, are joint with PG&E

teams.

Our teams aren't just PG&E, county teams.

They are

joint.

We have local environmental monitoring laboratories with

the latest state-of-the-art radiological equipment that is
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jointly manned by county and PG&E people available in that area.
All of this information on radiological conditions will be
transmitted back to the central emergency operation facility
where experts from all affected agencies (PG&E, the county, the
NRC and the State of California) gather together in one location
which we call the "unified does assessment center."

Together, we

come out with a single unified consistent set of recommendations
for handling the emergency or responding to the emergency from a
radiological condition.
We think this is a very important feature of our plans,
because it eliminates the confusion caused by conflicting reports
and recommendations.
train.

Finally, like all other utilities, we

We have ten joint agency drills.

Drills that involve

local officials as well as PG&E officials, state and county.
That is basically two a year for the last five years.

In

addition to that, we have had numerous training sessions with our
own people, the county and state people on specific aspects of
the planning (i.e., does assessments and monitoring).

All of our

experiences have been judged to be extremely successful.
In summary, we have a comprehensive set of plans in the
San Luis Obispo area and for the local county.

They can be used

for not only an accident or emergency at the plant, but for fire,
flood, or earthquakes.

Thank you.

MR. FRANCIS C. JACKLEY:
Jackley.

Good afternoon.

I'm F. C.

I'm Manager in Nuclear Affairs Emergency Planning for

28

the Southern California Edison Company.

One of my prime

responsibilities is the coordination of emergency plans for the
site and off-site agencies.

We, like other utilities, have an

emergency plan that we are very proud of.
There is one item that I would like to bring to your
attention.

San Onofre, the three units, are located on a 84 acre

site, entirely on Camp Pendleton Marine Base, a federal property.

•

In San Diego County, our nearest city is about three (3) miles
north, which is the City of San Clemente.

Our three units (with

Unit One going on line in 1968, Unite Two in 1983 and 1984),
combine capacity to serve about four million people.
plan that has been active since 1986.

We have a

The plan has been revised

and improved after Three Mile Island in 1980.
One of the items we are very proud of is called, "The
Interjurisdictional Planning Committee."

This is a group of

individuals, not only the utility, located off-site in the Cities

•

of San Clemente, San Juan Capistrano and Orange and San Diego
counties, Camp Pendleton Marine Base, and the California State
Park.

They meet monthly and review, update, revise and talk

about the emergency plan as it relates to San Onofre and the
off-site.
That is about as abbreviated as I can make it.
have an EOS and TSC.

I will leave it at that.

CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

Ms. Molina?

Hauser and finally, Mr. Sher.
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We do

Thank you.

Then, Ms. Hughes, Mr.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA:

I have the same question that I

posed to the previous witnesses.

In this test, could you provide

for the total safety of the public in its surrounding area in an
emergency?
MR. JACKLEY:
the report.

That's really the finally bottom line of

That has to be the conclusion that FEMA and the NRC

reach or you would, for all practical purposes, flunk the test.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA:
out.

How is it measured?

is no score.

That's what I'm trying to figure

They said there is no rating.

There

How is safety measured then?

MR. JACKLEY:

It is generally measured by the exercised

agreeing on a number of goals for that exercise, and things that
you are going to test.

There is a determination made by

evaluators that are present at the exercise as to whether they
think you met those goals.

It is not done numerically.

They

said one of the criteria for this test is you must demonstrate
your ability to collect and analyze environmental monitoring
samples.

You have to show that.

They will have an evaluator

a environmental monitoring team make a judgment on their
technical expertise as to whether you did the test correctly or
not.

When they come to their final conclusions, they looked at

all the objectives fundamentally.

If you don't meet all of the

objectives, you flunk the exercise.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA:

I know you would flunk, but what

happens when you flunk?
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MR. JACKLEY:

It depends on the circumstances.

You

really should be asking that question of the NRC.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA:
MR. JAMES SHIFFER:

They told to to ask you.

No, they didn't.

If they come up

with a finding that we could not protect the health and safety of
the general public, the ball would be in their court as to what
they would want to do.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA:

Let me just quickly try to get to

my point, because everybody is going to pass the ball to the
other again.
MR. SHIFFER:

I'm trying to answer the question.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA:

The ultimate public safety in the

assessment score evaluation, if anyone stops you from continuing
that test, what do they do?
MR. BRUCE NORTON:

Jim, let me take a crack at that.

First of all, there is not just a single plan.
important to understand.
county plan.
integrated.

•

I think that is

There is a utility plan.

There is a state and federal plan.

There is a
They are all

The drills that we have once a year certainly

implements the utility, the county and the state plans.
are graded by FEMA and/or the NRC.
receiving a "flunking" grade.

Those

As Mr. Shiffer said you could

It's unacceptable.

If your

performance was unacceptable, you would have to fix the plant.
You would have to immediately repair the plant.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA:

So, there is an accountability?
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MR. NORTON:

Absolutely.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA:

There is a certain standard

within that evaluation process you must meet?
MR. NORTON:
minute,

Absolutely.

If you think about it for a

makes sense it is not a multiple choice test where you

come out with a score of 83%.

For example, when they say you

have to have the ability to evacuate people from the site in a
reasonable length of time, you do a mock evacuation.
in observers.

They send

Those professional observers rate you on whether

or not you did that in a reasonable time.

It isn't a score of

83%, but it is either reasonable, unreasonable or unacceptable
length of time for evacuation.

In that sense, you are rated.

These reports that FEMA was mentioned are very detailed.
spend a least a full day on the drills.

They

They spend a great

amount of time writing reports in great detail of each step of
the operation:
what poorly.

Who did what.

Why?

How you can improve?

1 facilities.

Who did what well?

Who did

Those reports are available

We have them at Diablo Canyon.

these gentlemen have them for San Onofre and SMUD.

I'm sure
There are

available to the public.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA:

Again, in all of the assessment

testing or evaluations that has been done up until now,
is fine as far as the standards created by FEMA or the
NRC?
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MR. NORTON:

For Diablo Canyon (to blow our horn for a

moment, we don't get much chance to do that), even antinuclears
have cited in other cases how good Diablo Canyon emergency plan.
I'm thinking specifically of the Shoreham proceedings where Mr.
Hubbard testified before this Committee in the past.

He

testified Diablo Canyon has an outstanding emergency plan, and if
only Shoreham could only have one like that.
I

plan.

It is a very good

It has a great deal of time, effort, thought and expense

put into it.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA:

That one was tested and it came

out outstanding?
MR. NORTON:

I think it is far to say that, yes.

think the word outstanding was probably used.

I

Words like that, I

will not use that exact word.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA:

Should you not meet the minimum

standards, the FEMA or NRC would evaluate and make changes?
I

MR. NORTON:

They can go so far as to suspend your

license and prevent you from operating.
MR. SHIFFER:
I

That has never happened.

The normal

process, assuming that the deficiencies were not just terribly
serious, require shutting the plant down.

Normally, you get

items identified called "deficiencies," which are expected to
correct with 30 days and recommendations you can correct by the
next exercise.
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ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA:
coordinate jurisdictions:
MR. SHIFFER:

local and state government?

Yes.

to the state and county.

Is that also true of the other

In general, FEMA's finding relates

The NRC's finding relates to us.

They

both use a similiar system.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA:
MR. SHIFFER:

They basically have 30 days.

Thirty days of what they consider as major

deficiencies.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA:
MR. SHIFFER:
MR. NORTON:

Major deficiencies?

Right.
It might help you also to understand that

these emergency plans are not just for nuclear accidents.

The

emergency plan in San Luis Obispo County, for example, was
totally derived from the nuclear plan.

It was funded by the

nuclear plan, the communication equipment, and the facilities.
It was used, as Mr. Shiffer pointed out, in 1985 for the horrible
fire they had last summer very successfully.

It was tested.

It

was shown to work.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

When you say the utility, do you mean

funded by the ratepayer?
MR. NORTON:
be

That's a good question.

That is presently

the CPUC (California Public Utilities Commission) on who

will fund it.

However, it will probably be the shareholders or

the ratepayers.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

Mr. Hauser?
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ASSEMBLYMAN HAUSER:

Does PG&E have a plan approved by

the NRC for evacuation under the worst case scenario, an
earthquake accident, for Diablo?
MR. SHIFFER:
MR. NORTON:

I would have to say yes.
The reason he is hesitating is because it

isn't called an earthquake plan. The worst case scenario for
earthquakes is contained within the plan.

•

The answer is

absolutely yes .
ASSEMBLYMAN HAUSER:

Does that include potential

earthquake damage to necessary roads?
MR. NORTON:

Absolutely.

I can even give you the name

of the consultant who did the work.
and was factored in by the counties.

It was a very large report
The affects of the

earthquakes on the emergency plan on evacuation from no effect to
the worst credible earthquake.
ASSEMBLYMAN HAUSER:
MR. NORTON:

When was the approved by the NRC?

The emergency plan was approved by the NRC

in either 1982 or 1983.

I can't give you the exact date off the

top of my head.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

This question is directed to SMUD.

Do you have provisions in your plan for an earthquake?
MR. MYERS:

Yes.

SMUD, like the other two utilities,

provides for many common natural hazards.
response plan.

35

It is a comprehensive

CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

It has nothing to do with the fact

that Diablo is located on the fault.

Is it considered in the

overall plan?
MR. MYERS:

It is a generic requirement of all licensees

to be able to address earthquakes.
MR. NORTON:
times.

It is located

earthquake fault.

That has been said about three or four
3~

miles.

That is close enough to an

Right on and earthquake fault and 31 miles

from an earthquake fault is quite different.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

It is the first time I heard you ever

admit there was a fault there.
MR. SHIFFER:

We litigated that for a long time.

ASSEMBLYMAN SHER:
MR. SHIFFER:
MR. NORTON:
fault.

Id the court decide that?

No, the court did not decide that issue.
The plant is not right on an earthquake

That is an unfair characterization.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

It is not an unfair characterization.

Maybe you disagree, but it is not unfair.

We haven't defined

what "on" is, Mr. Sher.
ASSEMBLYMAN SHER:
you won't regard as unfair.

I have a couple of questions I hope
In the material that was furnished

to us, there is a recent article from the Wall Street Journal
following the accident in the Soviet Union.
disagree with the statements in that article.

I assume you would
The first

statement is "For the nearly hundred commercial nuclear reactors
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in the U.S., the emergency evacuation plans are outdated and
could prove ineffective in the event of an accident."

Arc they

outdated?
MR. SHIFFER:

Not, not at all.

ASSEMBLYl{AN SHER:
MR. SHIFFER:

Is the article incorrect?

I'm only going to speak for Diablo.

I

feel confident the others are in the same situation as we are.
ASSEMBLYMAN SHER:

Each of you agree that Rancho Seco is

up to date and effective?
MR. MYERS:

In my opinion, it is.

ASSEMBLYMAN SHER:

A chemical engineer at Berkeley

states in this article, "Scientists complain that the evacuation
plans are further flawed because neither the government nor the
nuclear industry have educated people in what happens during a
nuclear accident."

You can't communication that kind of

information until there is a real emergency."

•

The article speaks

to how the plans are written in scientific and technical terms •
People will not understand it.

Are you required to actually hold

a drill of pretending there is an nuclear accident in evacuating

•

an area similiar to a fire drill held in an elementary school?
MR. SHIFFER:

The answer is, to a limited extent, yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN SHER:

Those are the support people.

What

about the technical people?
MR. SHIFFER:

We simulate evacuation of major areas.

have conducted limited scope evacuations primarily of certain
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We

schools.

However, we have not conducted major evacuations of the

population.
ASSEMBLYMAN SHER:
a meltdown on Sunday?

Wouldn't that be useful if there was

You would then evacuate the people who

would be normally evacuated in case of the real nuclear accident.
MR. NORTON:

Professor Shiffer has pointed out earlier

when the large fire occurred in San Luis Obispo, our emergency
plan was successful in an actual emergency situation.

Fire was

raging on both side of Highway 101 (the highway was ultimate
closed), our plan was proved to be successful.
ASSEMBLYMAN SHER:

Were people evacuated from their

homes?
MR. NORTON:

Yes, absolutely.

ASSEMBLYMAN SHER:
about a meltdown.

That was due to a fire.

I'm talking

I'm talking about this plan that shows a 10

mile protection zone around the plant where'evacuation might be
required.

Did you have anything like that?
MR. NORTON:

The 10 mile zone around the plant is far,

far less populated than the people we evacuated for the fire last
summer.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

Mr. Sher, part of what they keep tell

us is the plan for the nuclear powerplant is the same for any
ma or disaster in any county.

What we are asking is there any

special protective measures you implement for nuclear
powerplants?
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MR. NORTON:

Most of us have included a 10 mile

evacuation plan, because the State of California regulations
require a much bigger basic emergency planning zone than 10
miles.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:
MR. NORTON:

For the evacuation process?

Absolutely.

The minimum distance is 13

miles and the maximum distance is over 20 miles, depending upon
the direction, at Diablo Canyon.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

In that same article Mr. Sher quoted,

the NRC is looking and thinking that even a 10 mile radius may be
greater than necessary given what happened recently.

The fact

that people are sometimes better off in their homes with the
doors and windowed closed.

Are you able to go back to the NRC

and say, we think this plan might work better in California?

Do

you have that kind of input into the emergency response plan?
MR. SHIFFER:

That was a very multiple kind of question.

ASSEMBLYMAN SHER:

It is a "yes" or "no" question.

CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

Let's go back and break them down one

at a time.
MR. SHIFFER:
your questions.

I can make some statements relating to

There is one thing in the article that I do

agree with, and that is many people in the past (not the
emergency planners, but some people) believe the only effective
response is evacuation.

There is and have been in many cases a

tendency for people to say a plan is not going to effective,
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unworkable or whatever unless you immediate evacuate.
have never been written in that manner.

Our plan

In other words, our

plan always look at the relative consequences of sheltering
versus evacuation.
decision.

You have to make a detailed technical

Where is the plume.

are the conditions?

How much time do you have?

What

What is the likely strength of the plume?

All those types of considerations are discussed in our
procedures.

Unified assessment centers and other involved

agencies make thoughtful decisions as to whether evacuation is
the appropriate response.

If evacuation is the appropriate

response, we would evacuate.

We do not simply evaluate the

entire emergency planning zone if it is not appropriate.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

Do you have the authority to make

those decisions?
MR. SHIFFER:

Absolutely.

CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

In other words, evacuation may or may

not be implemented depending on whatever is decided.
MR. SHIFFER:

That's correct.

In every exercise,

evacuations have all been staged evacuations.
direction of the presumed plume.

We look at the

We evacuate in stages.

The

people in close proximity would be evacuated first before we move
to

people further away from the plant.

That is done in

unction with our advisors and the people involved in the
Sheriff's Department given the best flexibility to do so.
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CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

Presently, do you have the

flexibility?
MR. SHIFFER:

Absolutely.

CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:
Committee this bulletin.

What about SMUD?

You have given the

How do you get this information to the

people?
MR. MYERS:

II

This information is our means of meeting the

annual requirements for providing information to the public
within the 10 mile zone around Rancho Seco.

Those two maps and

calendar are means of providing information about the emergency
plan to the public.

Each of the residence within the 10 mile

zone is mailed a packet of this information on an annual basis.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:
Mr. Hauser.

This is a new occurrence thanks to

Wasn't that your requirement that this be mailed?

Haven't you been doing that prior to the new law?
MR. MYERS:

We have been doing it either my mail or hand

delivery.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

Mr. Sher?

ASSEMBLYMAN SHER:

I assume this hearing was prompted by

the recent incident in the Soviet Union.

A lot of the witnesses

might want to answer in response to a variety of incidences that
can occur where the responses may be different.

I'd like to talk

about the kind of incident that occurred at Chernobyl in the
Soviet Union recently that prompted these hearings.

I assume if

that is done, the appropriate response would involve an
evacuation.

Am I

right on that assumption?
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MR. SHIFFER:
MR. MYERS:

Certainly.
Yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN SHER:

Given what you know about Chernobyl,

and assuming you had an accident on the same scale, are your
plans effective enough to evacuate those areas without death to
anyone apart from the immediate explosion?
some doubt.

We're told there is

Two person were killed from the immediate explosion

at Chernobyl.

If you had an accident of that magnitude, the

record would be as good at your plants?

Obviously, two persons

is not a good record.
MR. SHIFFER:

To make your question a little fair, when

you say a comparable accident, let's talk about a comparable
release.
ASSEMBLYMAN SHER:
wou

never happen at Diablo.
MR. SHIFFER:

it is

You are going to tell me that it

s

Not a comparable accident, but let's say

for a comparable release.

ASSEMBLYMAN SHER:

You're speaking of a fire of that

?
MR. SHIFFER:
the
go
inc

I am going to have to argue with you about

of that magnitude.

In my mind, the answer is yes.

now for Diablo Canyon.

You are asking an

speculative question.
ASSEMBLYMAN SHER:

It use to be speculative until it
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I am

MR. SHIFFER:

You are asking me to ask what comparable

magnitude did it release.

can't tell you exactly what

I

magnitude was the release.
ASSEMBLYMAN SHER:

However, you do know it was a bad

release?
MR. SHIFFER:

Right.

ASSEHBLYMAN SHER:

D.oes your plan contemplate responding

to a release of that magnitude in a way that would protect
against injury, death, and long term effect?
MR. SHIFFER:

Yes, it does.

ASSEMBLYMAN SHER:

Do you have confidence that it would

be successful?
MR. SHIFFER:

Yes, I do.

ASSEMBLYMAN SHER:
MR. MYERS:
MR. NORTON:

Yes.
Yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN SHER:
the liability?

Is that true with Rancho Seco?

Would you be prepared to underwrite

Are you that confident?

MR. SHIFFER:

The utility do underwrite the bulk of the

liability.
ASSEMBLYMAN SHER:

I mean personally.

Does your family

live in that emergency area of these plants or do they live
outside the 10 miles zone?
MR. NORTON:
facility.

I personally spend a lot of time at the

I take my wife and children frequently.

43

I have stayed

many times in the San Luis Obispo and Pismo Beach areas, and have
no fear whatsoever.
MR. SHIFFER:

I've lived there for 10 years.

ASSEMBLYMAN SHER:
MR. SHIFFER:

It wasn't working for 10 years.

That's true.

At the time I've lived

there, it was expected Rancho Seco to be working.

My job was to

be there when it worked.
ASSEMBLYMAN SHER:

Did you move out when Diablo came on

line?
MR. SHIFFER:

No, I did not.

I moved out when my job

required me to do so.
MR. JACKLEY:

I live in San Clemente for 10 years, which

is 3 miles of the plant.

My wife and family live there.

grandchildren come down and see me.

My

Our plan is effective and

would be very, very safe for the citizens.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

There were a couple of questions on

what you perceive as the state's role relating to safety.

Do you

see any role for the state in terms of greater assurance for the
people we represent?
MR. NORTON:

Our experience has been primarily with EOS;

it has been a very positive experience.

I would ask you to

continue to fund them and make sure they have the right kinds of
people to continue to do their job.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

Do you see local governments having

to pick up some of the expenses?
partnerships with you?
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Are there any joint

MR. SHIFFER:

Absolutely.

We have funded substantial

amounts of emergency equipment.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

That's on a voluntary basis.

There

is no mandate which requires you to expend any money on them.
MR. MYERS:

Madam Chairwoman, there is Senate Bill 1473

that does provide for licensee reimbursement.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

Is that measure presently in the

Legislature or has it become law?
MR. MYERS:
Legislature.
presently.

It has passed through both Houses of the

There is a follow-up measure in the Legislature
I believe it is SB 1976.

MR. SHIFFER:

SB 1473 has been in effect since 1982.

CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

Thank you.

Are there any other

questions from the Members of the Committee to the witnesses.

If

not, we thank you for your testimony.
Our next witnesses will be Anne Vasquez and Sean Crowder

•

representing state and local government •
MS. ANNE VASQUEZ:

Members of the Committee, I am Anne

Vasquez from the State Office of Emergency Services.

I am

responsible on the state level for all radiological emergency
programs.
The Office of Emergency Services (OES) is responsible
for several aspects of the preparedness in nuclear power.
first is planning.

The

What she is passing out to you is the

legislation that began the process.
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The concept of legislation

was due to an issue that came out in the question to the NRC,

FEMA and the utilities.
Senator Garamendi began the project upon which I work,

and which funds both the state and local jurisdictions.
the legislation in 1979.
sunset clause.

It was chaptered in 1979.

We continued the project in SB 1473.

clause is the first day of 1988.

He began

It had a
The sunset

Senator Bill Campbell has

agreed to continue the project by carrying legislation for us in
SB 1976.

That bill appropriates funding for all the state and

local costs.

All the funds come though the State Controller's

Office, and then administered by my office.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN CATHIE WRIGHT:

You started in 1976?

All

you have been doing is advancing the sunset date.
MR. VASQUEZ:

Yes.

Committee the other day.

We were in the Appropriations

If I remember correctly, we move the

total sunset date; it became part of the budget process.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

We got you funded.

Now, tell us what

you
MR. VASQUEZ:
re

The Office of Emergency Services (OES} is

ible for writing the state emergency response plan,

coordinating the planning of other state agencies for nuclear
, and assisting the local jurisdictions in their planning.
As directed by Senate Bill 1183 in 1979, the state plan has been
completely upgraded and accepted by Governor's Emergency Council
in 1985; it is currently being reviewed by the Federal Emergency
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Management Agency.

Local plans have also been upgraded,

reviewed, and accepted by OES formally, and submitted with the
state plan for acceptable by FEMA.
OES is also responsible for conducting and/or
participating regularly in nuclear power training drills and
exercises.

Drills with all three California sites (Rancho Seco,

Diablo Canyon and San Onofre) are conducted on a regularly
scheduled basis as mandated by federal regulations.
CHAIRWOHAN MOORE:
MR. VASQUEZ:

Yes.

Are those the biannual exercises?
Full scale exercises involving

state, county, and city utility personnel are conducted in each
site biannually.

These exercises are reviewed and graded by FEMA

(Federal Emergency management Agency) , DPA (Environmental
Protection Agency) , DOE (Department of Energy) , NRC (Nuclear
Regulatory Commission), USA (U.S. Department of Agriculture), and
other federal agencies.

•

The way that work is FEMA as the coordinating agency
brings together an evaluation team.
stand behind us.

•

They take notes.

These people come in and
They develop their comments

and review .
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

Do you feel that your office has

adequate input into that process?
MS. VASQUEZ:

Yes, we do.

CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

Do you have an opportunity to say you

have changes?
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MR. VASQUEZ:

Very much so.

In some cases, members of

my staff (rather than participating in the exercise as a play)
will participate as a reviewer as a part of the federal team.
We're done that in Oregon at the Trojan Nuclear Powerplant.
have expertise from other states.

We

In Arizona, we are planning on

doing that as well.
OES ensures that any weaknesses identified by the
exercises are corrected.

We do that through negotiations with

both the federal members and the local jurisdictions.

Since

1979, there has been 11 full scale exercises in California.
Federal critiques of these events have identified no significant
flaws in emergency planning or response.
OES also has responsibility for responding to a nuclear
power emergency in California.

OES would coordinate all state

resources from its operations center here in Sacramento.
Further, OES maintains a cadre of response team members who
reports to local operation centers, and help assisting in an
emergency, identifying appropriate public actions, and providing
any other assistance requested by local jurisdictions.
Nuclear power preparedness in California is an ongoing
program.

Local, state, utility and federal representatives work

together daily to ensure the greatest protection of the public.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

Why don't we hear from Amador County?

MR. SEAN CROWDER:

I'm Sean Crowder.

I'm the

Coordinator of Emergency Services for the County of Amador.
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I

paint somewhat a much less rosy picture of preparedness around
the nuf'!lear powerplant as the former witnesses.

It bears some

explanation in hearing the testimony that the Committee should
understand there are a number of plans.

There is a FEMA plan, a

state plan, a utility or on-site plan, as well as (at least in
the case of Rancho Seco) three county plans which relates to the
plant.
I was intrigued by Mr. Sher's comment about can the

I

state do something to actually assist with legislation to improve
emergency preparedness.

I believe the state can.

There have been discussion to shrink the emergency zone
from 10 miles down to 5.

As a matter of fact, there have been

discussion it should be expanded to 25 miles as oppose to the 10
miles.

I believe for the 10 miles emergency planning zone,

planning at this point is adequate.

However, if you look beyond

the 10 miles, you will take into account the severity of the
Russian incident which stemmed 18 miles.

There should be some

additional planning between 10 to 25 miles from a nuclear
powerplant.

The incident does not need to be of the same

magnitude which occurs within the first 10 miles.

However, there

needs to be some additional planning done in that area.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

May I ask a question?

Sure.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

On the point where you indicated

it should go from 10 to 25 miles, would that be based on the
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extent of the emergency?

I wouldn't think you would want to go

25 miles if it wasn't a dire emergency.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

What he is saying you need to

consider a 25 mile radius in case of an emergency.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

I understand that.

I'm asking

him if he doesn't think it should be more or less a tier
approach?
MR. CROWDER:

That's correct.

That is what I'm saying;

the tier approach.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

Ms. Hughes?

ASSEMBLYWOMAN HUGHES:

Do you really mean 15 miles from

the 10 mile radius or do you mean 25 miles from the 10 mile
radius?
MR. CROWDER:

I believe the existing planning which is

done from the plant boundary to 10 miles is where the main
planning should be done.

In addition, an additional 15 miles, up

to 25 miles, should be considered.
I do not believe even within the 10 mile radius,
planning is absolutely adequate for various reasons.

The State

of California should be given some type of enforcement authority
concerning the plans and the utilities.

For instance, my county

has had substantial trouble in getting cooperation from the
utility in correcting minor or not minor problems.

We had a

situation where we were unable to activate the sirens in Amador
County due to an electrical failure.
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It took us two years to

finally get an auxiliary analyst established by Rancho Seco for
our county.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

I thought they were saying all these

things had to be responded to within a 30-day period?
MR. CROWDER:
problem.

It has taken two years to correct this

It was corrected last month after my board of

supervisors complained two years ago.

We have some major

inadequacies that still exists.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:
that?

What would the state reaction be to

If you're coordinating those activities and they got a

situation where they can't even notify the people with the
sirens, is there any role you play in your coordination with the
Office of Emergency Services?
MR. VASQUEZ:
that area.

There has been a few technical problems in

There has been a few delays on some of those items.

I concur with that.

We do go to the SMUD people and say, we want

this corrected right away.

They have had a history of being a

little slow in responding; that has changed with their new
management.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

You're saying it wouldn't take two

years now to correct an emergency?
MR. VASQUEZ:L

Not in our experience with new

management.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

Obviously, you didn't have any

authority to correct a deficiency in an expedite manner?
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MR. VASQUEZ:

Authority lies in licensing with the NRC.

We go to the NRC with FEMA and say, we have to have this
corrected.

We keep at it and we keep pushing for it.

As I say

with the new management at SMUD, we do not see any further
delays.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

I would think this would be

considered an emergency if the emergency sirens do not operate at
Rancho Seco during an nuclear incident.

Did Amador County go to

the state in term of receiving state assistance from

FE~m

and the

NRC?
MR. CROWDER:

Yes, the state has assisted.

The point I

was making is the state really has no authority to compel the
utility to correct the problem.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:
MR. VASQUEZ:

That's the point I was going to make.

The federal plan has been adopted by the

state mandate that there must be a backup warning system if the
siren fails, because you must anticipate minor technical
fai

s.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:
MR. VASQUEZ:

Obviously.

The responsibility to design the backup

system is the responsibility of the county.

Whenever a siren

system is out, they accept it like any other emergency.
must be able to advise their citizens.

They

Nuclear power is the only

of emergency in which we have installed these massive sirens.

5~

CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

Obviously, that's true.

If this is

an integral part of the plan, I would have to assume they thought
it was important when it was established.
MR. VASQUEZ:
repaired.

We depend on the backup system until it is

SMUD has corrected their lag period on that particular

issue with their new management.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

We are not trying to point fingers.

We are trying to understand the role we have.

This is not to be

critical, but how do we go about getting system failures resolve
quickly so we don't put the safety of the residences of the State
of California in jeopardy?
MR. CROWDER:

My board of supervisors failed to approve

the Rancho Seco plan as oppose to what Ms. Vasquez said.
may have been submitted.

They

However, the board of supervisors has

never approved that plan, because they have concerns in two basic
areas.

•

As oppose to what Mr. Nikas said earlier, there has been

no substantial training around Rancho Seco at least for off-site
authorities; that is a continuing concern of the board.

We are

in the process of correcting that, but presently it has not

•

occurred .
The other area is basically funding.

The current

legislation allows for $100 thousand per reactor to be given to
the local agencies.
Seco.

That is inadequate; at least around Rancho

It may be adequate elsewhere.

My proposed budget for this

coming fiscal year exceeds that $100 thousand by $30 thousand if
it is approved by the state.
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CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

There are no provisions for cost of

living increases?
MR. CROWDER:

There is no legislative process for that.

We do sit down and negotiate with the utility.
cooperative.

They have been

However, there is no legislation to assure they

will continue the funding for the off-site authorities.
There are a couple of other comments that were made
previously.

I'm talking about the failure of the system.

One of

the things the state needs is enforcement authority in the
notification process.

I have with me just some brief notes that

states just in the month of May, the primary notification system
to Amador County has been down for 44 hours.
down for 47 hours.
43 days.
re

Last month, it was

In the month of June of 1984, it was out for

This is a primary system. There are backup system which

upon basic land lines, and telephone lines.

If an actual

emergency occurs, there would be some substantial problems in
actually communicating or coordinating the state, utility, and
the other two counties.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:
the state?

Have you communicated this problem to

If you have, what was the reaction on correcting this

matter?
MR. CROWDER:

I have been advised by the NRC to submit

my documentation directly to them.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

Under normal circumstances, he would

come to you and tell you the system is down?
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MS. VASQUEZ:

Yes.

He brings it to our attention.

The

problem is technical in this particular type of alerting system.
The local jurisdictions have asked for an alerting system which
allows to communicate on the phone all at once.

It is particular

hard to keep those systems up and running; there has been
technical problems.

Again, the state has taken a lead in

resolving this problem.

•

We finally have a new management system

at SMUD to resolve that problem .
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:
plans go unattended?
periods of time?

Could the emergency equipment or

Is the equipment out of order for extended

For example, you alluded to the sirens being

inoperable for 43 days.
MS. VASQUEZ:

There is a backup notification system

which is simply public telephones.

We are 45 minutes from them.

We can patch in to their Sheriff's Department with radio through
the OES headquarter's radio net.
I

We were told that backup equipment is not important.
Now, we are hearing that the primary system appears not be
important either.

I

MS. VASQUEZ:

The primary system is important, because

it allows conference calling; that is why it was established.
There has been problems with it.

We won't deny that.

The reason

that it hasn't been a stop operation, the
public-safety-is-threatened type of issue.
identified.

The backup system was

In other words, we haven't said that is the only way
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we have of telling them of what's going on.
we originally designed the plan.

It is the main way

We ran into problem with it

was separation of AT&T.

To get a phone fixed was very

hard
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:
way.

We know; a lot of people feel that

The phone company is really what we need to address at some

point.

What role is the state playing in trying to help

coordinate these things and get them moving expeditiously?

If

that is a part of your safety planning, who has the ultimate
authority?
MS. VASQUEZ:

We are work1ng on those issues, and have

been working on the issues in the past.
MR. CROWDER:

If I can make a slight exception to Ms.

Vasquez's' statement; one of the things that is of concern to my
county if Rancho Seco is allowed to run a nuclear powerplant, why
can't they operate a phone?

We have not seen that happening.

It

ses questions on their capability to run a nuclear powerplant.
I can document as far back as 1983 the same problems with the
phone system.
cou

If the state had some enforcement, the Governor

order a shut down of the plant until it is corrected.

Some

mechanism has to be available to correct those problems.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:
Governor's authority.
e
j

li

A shutdown is not exactly one of t.he

We have the NRC.

We have the authority to

mechanisms relating to rates which 1s the PUC's

sdiction.

56

MR. CROWDER:

FEMA also mentioned counties are required

to participate in the emergency response plan exercise.

It is my

understanding the current law requires the counties to have their
own plan.

However, state law does not require the counties to

bring their plan up to any specific standards other than
obtaining state approval.

There is no requirement that the

county must demonstrate their plan in an actual exercise.

If the

County of Amador chose not to participate in an exercise, there
is no federal or state law requiring them to do so.

The training

needs to be required by the state to ensure it is been
implemented.
To answer Ms. Molina's question on whether or not they
actually receive a pass of fail on an exercise, there is no FEMA
grading system.

The counties have asked for a grading system.

We do not see scores.

You only receiving a pass or fail score.

The county also has concerns about the information flow.

•

FEMA and the NRC don't have any discussions directly with the
counties on their concerns.
communication.

•

It goes to the state for that

Direct communication between the federal

authorities and the local authorities should be considered.

It

is the locals responsibility to provide that immediate response
to any disaster.

Waiting for the federal agencies for 12 hours

for a response would probably be more like 24 hours.
MS. VASQUEZ:

Mr. Crowder is incorrect.

Thank you.

There are

requirements for local jurisdictions to plan, exercise and drill.
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There is simply circuitously found in the Emergency Service Act
which validates the state's nuclear powerplant plan that directs
al jurisdiction within a given zone's plan.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

Does it provide any sanction for

those we don't have a emergency response plan?
MS. VASQUEZ:
the

funds.

The sanctions aren't there, but we control

So, we can simply not provide them funding.

CHAIRW0~1AN

MOORE:

MS. VASQUEZ:

\Ale

being whom?

The Office of Emergency Services cannot

accept the budgets submitted by local jurisdictions if they do
not use their money allocated for nuclear powerplant
preparedness.

That is what the money is earmarked for, and the

money would simply be cut off.

In that case, other resources

would have to be used to respond to a nuclear emergency in that
area.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

That would be even worst than no

legislation at all.
Sacramento.

Let's hear from the County of

Ms. Hopwood?

MS. CAROL HOPWOOD:

I'm Carol Hopwood.

I'm Emergency

Operations Coordinator for the County of Sacramento.

The County

of Sacramento, perhaps even more than the other tvm counties
involved, has a very primary role since Rancho Seco is in our
county.
We also share some of the concerns of Mr. Crowder.
po

His

is well taken that we have had some initial problems with
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the two-digit ring down system.

However, we are trying to

address those issues right now wjth the Public Information Office
Committee composed of SMUD, the counties and the state.

We are

looking at an alternative system to the system that currently
exists.

We are confident that we will be able to get a better

system in the near future.
Ms. Vasquez's point is also well taken.

Since Mr.

Lorell came on board (SMUD) as General Manager, we have found
that they are willing to

l~ten

more to our complaints and

concerns.

•

With regard to the December 26th incident which took
Rancho Seco down and has not allowed it to operate since that
time, the counties have made it quite clear to SMUD we would very
much oppose the plant operating if we are not able to strengthen
the communications links between the control center at the plant
and our outside communication centers.

The County of Sacramento

will go on record pubicly if we do not believe that appropriate
training is done before the plant goes back into operation.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

Have you done a response that

training exists at Rancho Seco?
MS. HOPWOOD:
they have put together.

Yes, we have.

There is an action plan

There has been some training with their

control room operators, the operators at the plan, and our
communications people.

Unfortunately, those meetings also

occurred during the time of the recent historical flood in
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Sacramento.

Mr. Baldwin, who is the coordinator from San Joaquin
I could not attend.

us

However, Mr. Crowder attended

for the counties.

That training has been done.

We insisted that more training be done, so that our
communications people actually know who they are talking to on
the other end of a telephone line.

When you know who you are

talking to, when you've seen that person, and when you have
with that person on a one on one basis, it is easier
to understand what the person on the other end of that telephone
line is going through.

That's our point.

If Rancho Seco does come back on line under the new
we
p

ll have a much better relationship with that

Sacramento County believes it has a very comprehensive
We have about 6,500 people in our emergency planning zone.

We

evacuate those people in a timely manner given any
panel needs to understand is that even in a

s
worse case scenar
is

s

(a core meltdown), there is still time.
element of time.

A nuclear powerplant does

not melt to the bottom of the containment vessel in a matter of
You do have some time.

30

What you also need to be aware of is, unlike the
1 p

s

conta

, Rancho Seco and all the American nuclear
are commercial powerplants do have
That is go1ng to make a difference in our favor
to planners.
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CHAIHWOMAN MOORE:

We all understand that.

Believe me,

the utilities have made that point.
MS. HOPWOOD:

As long as SMUD has that plant up and

running, our most important responsibility is the protection of
our citizens.
plan works.

Sacramento County is acutely aware of that.
We are confident it works.

exercise to make sure it works.

Our

We test on a biannual

However, there are some

communication links that needs to be improved.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

Ms. Hughes?

ASSEMBLYWOMAN HUGHES:

When you say we have some time

here in Sacramento, how much time are you talking about?
MS. HOPWOOD:
variables.

What we're talking about is a variety of

It depends upon the nature of the accident.

If you

are talking about a fire, I don't believe the kind of a fire that
occurred at Chernobyl necessarily might occur in our plants.
it did, there would still be a containment building there.

If
If we

get to a point where they cannot cool the core and goes into a
partial meltdown which happened at Three Mile Island, the
containment vessel will do what it suppose to do.

It would

contained the radio activity.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN HUGHES:

In a case of a fire similiar to

Chernobyl, how long would the containment vessel hold the radio
activity?
MS. HOPWOOD:

Is SMUD here?
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~1R.

DON MARTIN:

Director of Publ

name is Don Martin.

Af

I'm a Health Physicist by training.

I

Seco.

I

emergency pl

1

To answer the quest

could not occur.

If there was a meltdown, I
realm of two, three to four days before

the meltdown
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course,

like that

ing material in the

to
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worked on the

, a f

s not

reactor vessel
think

I'm the

amounts of

During

time, of

ll occur with that radio

active material.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN HUGHES:

If

we would have two

s to evacuate?

MR. MARTIN:

At
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1 emergency plans

1
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in the state.
grants.

Those are funded generally from the federal

The planning for responding to a fire or an emergency at

one of the small research reactors is done at the local level and
reviewed by my regional staff.
The effects of an accident at those much smaller
reactors is not something that would effect an entire city.
Basically, what we do in those cases is make sure that the first
response is to police and fire departments, and make sure they
are trained to recognize and respond to a radiological accident.
In many cases, the community or the business that owns that
reactor pays for all the local responders to be training, and we
review those plans.
ASSEMBLY~~N

HAUSER:

However, not in every case.

You

said in many cases.
MS. VASQUEZ:

The problem is I can't list all of the

reactors right off the top of my head.
ASSEMBLYMAN HAUSER:
north.

We do have a commercial plant up

What about Humboldt Bay?
MS. VASQUEZ:

I

I am a little cautious.

Humboldt was listed in the original

legislation, because at the time PG&E had not announced they were
going to be decommissioned.
going to be operating.

They have now announced it is not

The cores are stored on site.

They are

so old, a lot of of the immediate isotopes have gone through
half-lifes.

Those cores are stored in their ponds that are

designed for that purpose, and will be there until some later
date that PG&E gets permission to put them some place else.
63 .

I understand they are safe where they are.

We checked

with the Department of Health Services Radiological Health
branch, and have a monitoring program making sure that store
ponds are functioning.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

Let me thank you for your

participation on this panel.

I'm sure we would like some further

dialogue to see if we can't work out some of the concerns that
were raised by the counties.
to correct those problems.

We look forward to working with you
There maybe something we can do

legislatively to respond.

For example, should we increase the

money in the Campbell bill?

Maybe that is one way we can help.

There is an appropriation of $100 thousand in the Campbell bill.
MR. CROWDER:

Yes, it is $100 thousand.

is inadequate for Rancho Seco.

However, that

Anne could probably addresses the

adequacies of the other counties.

It should be at least $300

thousand or slightly more for Rancho Seco.
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE:

We will be discussing that with you

as the bill moves through the Legislature.

Again, the Members of

the Assembly Utilities and Commerce Committee thank you for your
participation, and look forward to working with you in the next
few months in this area.

With that, this meeting is adjourned.

* * * * * * * *
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STATEMENT OF
DEAN M. KUNIHIRO
REGIONAL STATE LIAISON OFFICER

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON UTILITY AND COMMERCE

CALIFORNIA STATE ASSEMBLY

I

May 7. 1986

Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Committee:
I am Dean M. Kunihiro, Regional State Liaison Officer
Regulatory Commission's Region

V

Office in Walnut

I am appearing before you today to provide you with

brief

regulations governing emergency preparedness at, and in the
nuclear power facilities licensed by the Nuclear

•

In August 1980, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
order to assure that adequate protective measures could be
of a radiological emergency at a licensed nuclear power
these regulations are enclosed with my
I would like to highlight some of the major

emergency preparedness regulations.

First,

license authorizing only fuel loading and

in the
low power

of the rated power), no NRC operating license for a
will be issued unless the NRC finds that there
adequate protective measures can and will be

•

radiological emergency.

The NRC bases its f

to whether the applicant's onsite emergency
is reasonable assurance that they can be
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
whether State and local governments' offsite emergency
whether there is reasonable assurance that

can be

Secondly, the regulations extend emergency
"Emergency Planning Zones."

considerations

One zone is related to direct

and the other to exposure via the food chain.

The exact size

configuration of these zones surrounding a
are determined by such conditions as demography,
characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries

• of the
which identifies the
meet.

There are

a wide range of
• state and local
ass
emergency
scheme

; use of a standard

establishment of emergency
as well as members of the
emergency
emergency response

would like to
and offsite
These

need to be
Tliey
of primary
lassification
among affected
establishment and
and provision for
of periodic

exercises.
the

, based on the

In

emergency preparedness
as well as proper
the

and engineered
of the public.

needed to protect
accident at
engineered

that the

measures

be bolstered
accident.

onsite conditions

do not
the way

entities react
accident.

from any
its
that proper means
and its
and the
actions in response
The Commission
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SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT
PRESENTATION TO THE UTILITIES AND COMMERCE COMMITTEE
CALIFORNIA STATE LEGISLATURE
APRIL 7, 1986
#

Gwen Moore, ChalrwomJn
Madam Chairwoman, Members of the Committee

•

My name is Robert W. Myers and I am employed with the Sacramento Municipal
Utility District as the Supervisor of Emergency Preparedness. One of the
major areas of my responsibility is to assure proper coordination of the
District Emergency Response Plans with those of the counties of Amador,
Sacramento, and San Joaquin and the State of California.
As a result of issuance of regulations and regulatory guidance by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission and the Federal Emergency Management Agency,
particularly the guidance contained in Criteria for Preparation of Evaluation
of Radiological Emergency Response Plan to Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG 0654
FEMA REPl Rev. 1, published November 1980, the Sacramento Municipal Utility
District has completely rewritten its Emergency Response Plan to conform with
this regulatory guidance and to properly integrate response functions of the
Sacramento Municipal Utility District with the response functions of the

•

with these jurisdictions.

D

Major planning standards covered by the regulatory guidance and described in
the plans and implementing procedures include the following topic areas:

counties and state jurisdictions.

Three major exercises have been completed

Assignment of Responsibility
Onsite Emergency Organization
Emergency Response and Resources
Emergency Classification System
Notification, Methods, and Procedures
Emergency Communications,
Fublic Education and Information

Emergency faci11ty and Equipment
Acc1dent Assessment
Protective Response
Radlo1og1cal Exposure Control
Med1cal and Public Health Support
Recovery and Reentry Plann1ng in Post Accident Operations
Exercises and Or1lls
Rad,ological Emergency Response Training
Respons1bil1ty for the Planning Effort
Development. Per1odic Review and Distribution of Emergency Plans

The Nuclear Regulatory Commiss1on and FEMA deliberately consolidated guidance
1ntended for use by State and local governments and that 1ntended to gu1de the
emergency planning and preparedness activities and NRC licensees because of a
shared belief that an integrated approach to the develo~ment of response plans
to radiological hazards 1s most likely to provide the best protection of the
health and safety of the public. NRC and FEMA recognize that plans of
licensees, State and local governments should not be developed in a vacuum or
in isolation from one another. Should an accident occur, the public can be
best protected when the response by all parties 1s fully integrated. Each
party 1nvolved must have a clear understanding of what the overall level of
preparedness must be and what role it will play 1n the event of a nuclear
acc1dent. This understanding can be ach\eved best if there 1s an 1ntegrated
development and evaluation of plans. There must also be an acceptance by
part1es and a clear recogn1t1on of the respons\b1llty they share for
safe-guard,ng pub11c health and safety.
In the sp1r1t of fulf1111ng this paragraph excerpted from NUREG 0654. the
Olstrlct and three count,es have had period1c plann,ng team meet1ngs for
overall coord1nat1on of plans and procedures for response to an 1ncident at
Rancho Seco. These plann\ng team meet1ngs have been held over the past
approx1mately five years.

-2-

1

Three major emergency response exerc\ses have been completed with these
jurisdictions \n the past four years. A fourth major exercise \~scheduled
for later this year.
Based upon the comprehensive nature of the current plans and procedures which
are \n place and have been trained, drilled and exercised; the Sacramento
Municipal Ut\lity District feels that the public health and safety can be
appropriately assured .

•
I

I
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REMARKS OF
JAMES D. SHIFFER
TO THE ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON
UTILITIES AND COMMERCE

•

MAY 7, 1986

Good afternoon,

r~adame

Chairwoman and members of the Committee.

I am James

D. Shiffer, Vice-President - Nuclear Power Generation, Pacific Gas and Electric
Company.

I have with me Bruce Norton, a licensing attorney retained by PGandE;

and Warren Fujimoto, a Supervising Engineer for PGandE who has general
responsibilities for emergency planning.
PG&E takes pride in our emergency planning effort and welcomes the
1

opportunity to discuss emergency preparedness for the Diablo Canyon Power Plant.
PGandE and San Luis Obispo County have gone to great lengths to assure that
sound emergency preparedness for the plant and the community is in place.
Emergency planning for our Diablo Canyon Power Plant began in 1973.

PGandE

began a major program in 1979 to enhance and expand its emergency planning for
the plant and the surrounding community.

Tens of thousands of manhours were

Page 2

spent improving all aspects of the plans.

The County, cities, school districts,

fire districts, state agencies and others have also developed extensive plans
with detailed implementing procedures.

The California State Disaster Council,

the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) have reviewed and accepted the plans.
Since 1981, ten major drills and exercises have taken place thoroughly
testing essentially all aspects of the plans.

Annually, 500 people from

government and PGandE participate in these drills and exercises.

As many as 40,

Federal Emergency Management Agency and Nuclear Regulatory Commission
representatives have evaluated these tests.

San Luis Obispo County, the State

Office of Emergency Services, and PGandE have received superior evaluations.
The plans are comprehensive yet flexible to respond to differing emergency
situations including floods, earthquakes, and fires.

The effectiveness of the

emergency plans was demonstrated during the extensive Las Pilitas fire of 1985.
San Luis Obispo County implemented its plans and procedures to coordinate
response actions.

Communication netvwrks, public information programs, and

evacuation of residents were all tested with excellent results.
Each year 800-900 local government employees are trained and retrained on

11

Page 3

their specific implementing procedures.

PGandE conducts annual training for

about 500 plant and corporate employees.
San Luis Obispo County and PGandE know training by itself is not enough.
The community must have an adequate understanding of the plans in place. The
County, with PGandE, has developed comprehensive community information and
education programs.

For instance, the County mails an emergency response

planning booklet annually to residents and businesses of the community.

The

booklet contains basic information on community response, protective actions,
family preparedness, radiation, and how to get further information.

Twice a

year the booklet is supplemented by newsletters to the community addressing

•

various emergency planning response topics .
Residents are encouraged, through advertising programs, to read the booklet
and keep it in a convenient location.
PGandE has confidence in the plan and the individuals who carry it out.
In the event of an emergency, the Diablo Canyon Control Room will notify San
Luis Obispo County within 15 minutes of an emergency declaration.
Office of Emergency Services and NRC will also be informed.

The State

These notifications

are ensured by multiple communications systems including radios, dedicated

Page 4

telephones, microwave systems, computer links, and pagers.

PGandE has also

provided automatic alarms in the State Office of Emergency Services Harning
Center in Sacramento which indicate high radiation or initiation of emergency
core cooling systems at the plant.
Initial notification begins the activation of emergency facilities.

State,

County, and PG&E personnel report to their emergency locations.
PGandE mans several emergency facilities at the plant, San Luis Obispo and
San Francisco.

At Diablo Canyon, personnel are dispatched to the Control Room

and Technical Support Center, and have the responsibility of managing onsite
recovery operations.
PGandE establishes a corporate incident response center at our San Francisco
headquarters.

The center provides access to the Company's considerable

technical and logistical resources.
In San Luis Obispo, PGandE built a single purpose, 3.5 million dollar,
emergency response facility to co-locate both San Luis Obispo County's Emergency
Operations Center and PGandE's Emergency Operations Facility.

This building is

the focal point for coordinating onsite and offsite recovery actions by the
County, the state, federal agencies and PGandE.

19
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I report to the Emergency Operations Facility to serve as the Recovery
Manager for PGandE.

As Recovery Manager, I manage the Company•s overall onsite

and offsite response activities.
The Emergency Operations Facility provides PGandE and the County with direct

•

access to detailed plant and radiological information.

Information is jointiy

evaluated by all responsible organizations enabling prompt decisions and
assuring timely actions are implemented.

The actions that may be implemented

range from keeping the community informed of the situation to evacuation.
San Luis Obispo County and PGandE also establish a Unified Dose Assessment
Center, at the Emergency Operations Facility, where weather and radiation data

•

are monitored.

Radiological monitoring teams consisting of County and PGandE

•

radiation detection equipment.

individuals are dispatched throughout San Luis Obispo County with appropriate
A computer system in the Unified Dose Assessment

Center provides projections and direct access to radiation monitors located
throughout the County and inside the plant. This computer information is also
directly available in Sacramento at the State Office of Emergency Services.
If protective actions involving the public are required, early notification
is given utilizing a network of 129 sirens distributed throughout the emergency

Page 6

planning zone.
station.

The sirens alert the public to tune to an emergency broadcast

The Emergency Broadcast System is made up of radio and TV stations

which will advise the public of appropriate actions to take.

During 1985 and

1986 the siren system has had a 99.5% availability due to a comprehensive
maintenance and testing program.
A joint Media Center has been established in San Luis Obispo near the
Emergency Operations Facility.

The Media Center is operated by San Luis Obispo

County, state, federal, and PGandE representatives and assures reliable,
consistent, and timely information is given to the public.
This has been a brief overview of the emergency response plans for Diablo
Canyon.

As you know, additional state and federal resources will play a

significant role in recovery operations.
In closing I would like to assure this Committee that it is PGandE's policy
to maintain the highest emergency preparedness standard.

rle know emergency

planning is dynamic and we will continue our efforts to assure that
comprehensive preparedness is provided at Diablo Canyon and in San Luis Obispo
County.
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MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE
Good afternoon.

I am Ann Vasquez, Chief of Radiological Programs Division

with the State Office of Emergency Services.

The role of Office of Emergency

Services in nuclear power preparedness is multi-faceted.
In planning, OES is responsible for writing the state emergency response plan,
coordinating the planning of other state agencies, and assisting local
jurisdictions in their planning.

As directed by Senate Bill 1183 (1979), the

state plan has been completely upgraded, accepted by the Governor's Emergency
Council in 1985, and is currently being reviewed by the Federal Emergency
Management Agency.

Local plans have also been upgraded, reviewed and accepted

by OES, and were submitted with the state plan for acceptance by FEMA.
OES is also responsible for conducting and/or participating regularly in
nuclear power training, drills and exercises.

Drills with all three

California sites -- Rancho Seco, Diablo Canyon and San Onofre -- are conducted
on a regularly scheduled basis, as mandated by federal regulations.
Full-scale exercises involving state, county, city and utility personnel are
conducted at each site biennially.

These exercises are reviewed and graded by

FEMA, EPA, DOE, NRC, USDA and other federal agencies.

I

OES ensures that any

weaknesses identified during these exercises are corrected.
Since 1979, there have been

}t

full-scale exercises in California.

Federal

critiques of these events have identified no significant flaws in emergency
planning or response.
OES also has responsibility for responding to a nuclear power emergency.

OES

.would coordinate all state resources from its operations center here in
Sacramento.

Further, OES maintains a cadre of response team members who would

report to local operations centers and help with assessing the emergency,
identifying appropriate public protective actions, and providing any other
assistance requested by local jurisdictions.
Nuclear power preparedness in California is an ongoing program.

Local, state,

utility and federal representatives work together daily to ensure the greatest
protection of the public.
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EXERCISE SUMMARY

The Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station Emergency Preparedness
fxercise was conducted on October 8, 1986.

•

The onsite (utility) exercise participation was evaluated by the
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region V. The onsite evaluation findings will be reported separately by that
agency.
The offsite (state and local jurisdictions) exercise participation
was evaluated by 28 representatives of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency and Regional Assistance Committee, Region IX.
The offsite evaluation findings are the subject of this report.
The objectives and the scenario for the exercise were developed
through a committee of utility, federal, state and local government representatives. Each of the Counties of Amador, Sacramento,
and San Joaqu1n established unique and innovative objectives and
scenario activities. All of the objectives, as established, were
met •

•
•

... There were no deficiencies noted by the evaluators. Areas for
corrective action, detailed later in this report, were identified
·by evaluators as: 1) a need to refine public notification procedures for more expedient activation of the Emergency Broadcast
System; 2) update plans and procedures to incorporate more elaborate prescripted messages for release by the Emergency Broadcast
System Stations; 3) update plans and procedures to incorporate
::newly developed operations resulting from pre-exercise drills;
and 4) to change the language used for public notification of
·· shelter and evacuation to identify and relate to familiar landmarks rather than mileage parameters (e.g., 2-, 5-, and/or 10mile emergency planning zone, etc.). The areas for improvement
that were suggested by evaluators for consideration by the state
and local offsite jurisdictions are detailed in the narrative portion of this report. All of the findings are considered to be
correctible through training activities and/or plan modification.
It was generally agreed among the evaluators that offsite jurisdiction participation in the exercise reflected an above average
performance. Many of the exercise participants are to be commended for the outstanding manner in which they performed their
assigned duties.
iv
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Exercis<: Detail, continued

2

Regicm '· Evaluation findings relative to those activities will ben.:ported ) 'fUr'ately by that agency •.
Due to the need for full activation of each of the emergency operations
centers for the counties participating in this exercise to respond to
a flooding emergency earlier this year, the Federal Emergency Management
Agency/Regional Assistance Committee, Region IX, accredited the offsite
radiological emergency response agencies with recognition for actual disaster activation of the emergency response organization and operations
and permitted simulation of certain physical activities previously planned
for demonstration during this exercise. This included prepositioning of
exercise participants and visual aids. No evaluators were assigned to
observe exercise participation (effected for training purposes only) at
the State Operations Center or the State Dose Assessment Center.
The exercise was evaluated on the b.asis of a jurisdictional capability
to implement current radiological emergency response plans and in
accord with established Federal Em~rgency Management Agency policy, criteria, and guidance. The exercise· evaluation criteria and process was
presented and coordinated with all' exercise participants to provide an
understanding of the process and the responsibility. A copy of the
issued Guidance Memorandum EX-1, Remedial Exercises, dated July 15, 1985,
is provided as Attachment C of this report to reflect the categories established for exercise evaluation findings. ·
The Federal Emergency Management Agency/Regional Assistance Committee,
. Region IX, evaluators were provided with background materials, exercise
objectives/scenario summary, past findings data, various planning docum~ntation, and other pertinent information in advance of the exercise.
An evaluator orientation to the localized sites, plans, and procedures
was conducted on October 6, 1986, by representatives from the State and
Counties and the utility. A pre-exercise evaluator's meeting was conducted on October 7, 1986 to address assignments, schedule, and postexercise activities. A site tour of the facilities, as assigned, was provided by onsite/offsite jurisdiction representatives. An evaluator roster
is provided as Attach~ent D to this report.
A timeline of emergency classification events is noted at Attachment E
of this report. The disparity in time between the two Counties of
Amador and San Joaquin in comparison to Sacramento County is directly
attributable to the decision-making element for Sacramento County being
located within the Emergency Operations Facility. The time :lapse in
activating the alert and notification system is addressed in detail in
both the narrative portion of this report and the findings matrix.
Exercise evaluators participated in an exercise, Controller conducted,
preliminary findings discussion immediately following the exercise at
each facility location. This discussion was used to clarify any questionable activities observed and to present an overview of preliminary
findings, if any.

.
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Exercise Detail, continued
Offsite Emergency Operat__iC?n~,

I

4
Ea~_ilit.Y_J-_i:LLs_0!2_

Area

The County (Amador, Sacramento and San Joaquin} Liaison staffs were prepositioned for the purpose of this exercise.· However, all County liaison
personnel were familiar with emergency response call up procedures that ·
are described in state and local offsite jurisdiction planning documents.
All three county staffs displayed professional manners and attitude,
appeared knowledgeable with plans and procedures, and were well trained.
leadership and decision-making skills were strong and effective. Communications and relations among and between the counties were excellent. All
actions taken were purposeful and resulted in coordination of emergency
response activities. All recommendations were in accordance with the plan
and, in the case of Amador and San Joaquin, were relayed to decision-makers
for concurrence.
The area assigned to the liaisons adequately provides and supports extended operations. Status boards in this area included information for:
offsite release, protective actio~s, situation, weather conditions, road
conditions, and emergency facilities. These status boards were all effectively implemented. The personnel designated as "runners" did an excellent
job of -keeping current information posted.
The adequacy of the emergency operations facility telecopier system between all offsite facilities and the ability of the telecopier (clerical
functions) to disseminate all transmissions in a timely manner were
successfully used and demonstrated. The County Liaison staffs successfully demonstrated their ability to establish and maintain appropriate
communications links. ..
County liaison participation in the limited discussions between decisionmakers to determine appropriate measures for controlled recovery and reentry demonstrated an ability to coordinate and consider appropriate actions.
o

The status board entries relating to classification change
data should indicate the time declared by the utility and
time notification is received by the County.

Offsite Emergency Operations Facility Public Information liaison Area
In essence, the public information effort was very good. The staff attitude
was excellent in the face of some adverse working conditions and inadequate
staff resources. The public information liaison representatives performed
their job in a sincere, competent manner. They worked consistently as a
team in a relatively efficient and effective mode of operation.
The objectives for this area of activity were met. It is obvious that
the physical presence of Amador and San Joaquin County public information
liaison representatives in the emergency operations facility would expedite
the production of emergency information for use by the media. Their presence
could possibly enhance the chances that the information is accurate and
consistent with the prevailing conditions and requirements.

1
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onal work space and private space for conferencing
ia son staffs ~1ouid also upgrade: the effiso, the impl'OVcment of the emergency operations
would enhance the total emergency operations

I
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releases was fair to good. Accuracy and congood. On the whole, information can be imtechnical terms and amplification of what
c. Most releases tended to be on the lean
the reason behind the protective actions; i.e.,
sks, etc.
nformation and the production of the news copy was
Public instruction seemed to be hampered by attempts
Emergency Broadcast System texts. The utility
ses. The State and each of the Counties released
ses was relptively smooth. Public information liaioperations facility briefings.
eases could be improved by dedicating
per jurisdiction.
liaison space is restrictive and encumiture. The round table in the
was used to keep press releases. It is
news releases be posted on the walls
removed to ·provide more space to
area.

was prepositioned. It was well organized and
tly operated. It had an adequately trained
were frequent. Status of the emergency conditions
ses were available and were posted in a timely
information for thhe media. The utility had
e to role p1ay t e media. They did this in an
an adversarial role when addressing the briefers.
on officers and technical briefers were superb.
were outstanding. News releases were rewere adequate maps and visual aids.
circuit television and all news briefings
k to the rumor control area. The utility
even addressed their liability to persons
losses as a result of the accident. They
a the Price-Anderson.Act that requires
tion was disseminated on the condition of
actions were explained adequately and timely.
ia coverage--two newspapers, three radio
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txercise Detail, continued
stations and fr.• ,,. television s'1tions.
mended for in!pr·•l'/t.:lllC:nt.

The uti1ity news releases should be less technical (see
news release comments below).

0

State and county news releases can be improved (see news
release comments below).
The utility should be less dominant at news briefings.
·The State should be more dominant at news briefings.

0

If Amador and San Joaquin County refuse to be represented
in person at the Emergency News Center, a speaker phone
system should be installed at the Emergency News Center
for conversations between the media and counties.

0

Rumor control officials by ~their own admission should
improve the quality of their responses. However, rumor
control was the best this evaluator has observed at~
exercise.

o

Quality of the Emergency Broadcast System messages can be
improved and clearer copies made available to the media.

o

News briefers should identify their county emergency
declarations and:wl)at they mean.
Releases

N~ws

1

The fo1lowing are areas :·ecom-

0

o

•

6

Some examples of the technical language used in the utility news releases
are:
0

Release #1 states ..... degradation of plant safety systems ...
It could perhaps simply identify an accident has occurred
which could result in .•.

0

Very few people would know what a ..... spent fuel assembly ••• "
was or what a ..... whole body exposure at the site boundary ••• "
means.

o

News Release #2. The average person would not know what was
meant by 11 The Reactor 'tripped' at 7:50 this morning due to
a reactor coolant pump vibration problem ...

o

News Release #4. Paragraph two says " ... major plant functions ... "
Suggest using .. plant operations" instead. Paragraph three,
..... small packing gland leaks ......

o

News Release #6. Paragraph two states " ... indicating the
likelihood of a release path from the decay heat removal
system ... ". The term "whole body radiation exposure is also
too technical. Reference to 11 Southern site boundary" should
be better identified.
·

i
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to the news relea e\ are as follows:
have a location of r·r:lc~,tse, such as
Operations Center or Liaison, etc.
System messages did not identify the
ease -by county or facility or both.
not state at the end of the release:
II

0

eases should identify whether they are being
State office, emergency operations cenoperations facility.
1 out the complete title instead of
news media may not identify with the
news releases d"id not provide the county
number nor did they recommend lisEmergency Broadcast System station.
news release No. 3 does not give the time
indicate what routes should be taken
process.
ease No. 3 does not give the evacuast System station messages should identify
. The messages should identify how oeople
car or transportation, and/or disabled, can
The message should also include a telepeople to call. Perhaps it should"refer
on brochure distributed by the utility
to travel to shelter or to identify the
sewhere in this report, the use of landmark
n 1 eu of mileage indicators would lend itself
ing of areas to be sheltered or evacua-

action reflected in the Findings Matrix of
ons for improving the release of public

Exn·r:ise Detail, continued
,..,:;1tion vii• ' :; Emergency Broadcast System.

8

They included:

',dcramentu County should update their plan to correct
the telephone number used for contact to KFBK for
placing them on standby. KFBK has four rotating telephone lines. During an actual emergency, there is a
strong possibility that all of these lines could be in
use. Emergency response plans should address this problem by instructing the user to call the station and if
a busy signal results to attempt to redial -- if the
second attempt fails, there should be an automatic direction to use the Remote Pickup Unit (RPU) (radio) to contact the radio station. Further, even if the user does
make contact on the initial standby call to the radio
station, they should inform the radio station to activate
or ensure the operability of the RPU in the event it has
to be used in lieu of the telephone. At the very least,
the plan should address use of the remote pickup unit for
advising the station to free a telephone line for contact.

•

° Controlled use of the Emergency Broadcast System Station

KFBK should be addr.essed by the Sacramento County staff.
There should be;a sjngle source of information provided to
the radio stad~n f'or"~t~nsistency with news releases and
activities emanating from the emergency operations facility
and the county emergency operations centers. At the present
time, the cities within Sacramento County can contact the
radio station directly to release information. The County
of Sacramento needs to arrive at some sort of an agreement
with these jurisdictions that all news releases through the
Emergency Broadcast System station will be funneled through
the County in order to ensure that the public is not confused by conflicting statements released through the radio
station.

.J>·

Transportation
Each of the County Radiological Emergency Response Plans address air
traffic restrictions in the emergency planning zones in the event of
a radiological emergency at the Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station.
However, this element of the plans has not been demonstrated during an
exercise.
0

It is suggested that consideration be given to demonstrating a capability to restrict air traffic in the
emergency planning zone during a radiological emergency at the next regularly scheduled exercise.

;. i
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ks run
zone of the
given to including the
on
ra lroad traffic that is provided
in the emergency planning zone during
at Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating
capability for restricting
demonstrated at the same time the
on is demonstrated.
pla1ming

third level County officials to effect
during the exercise. The Amador County
ly familiar with plans and procedures.
individual staff was limited and a bit
ad~quate.
Security was enforced. Backup
o Emergency Services were in place even
of the service chiefs had clerks that
ons. The service chiefs were continually anty and were prepared to take precautionary
County used second and third level players,
they were well trained.
assigned,provided briefings to the
and at regular intervals, including
:clarification. It appeared as if the in1 as there was no interaction on these
the Service Chiefs.
Services Coordinator
of the service chiefs
improved interaction.
operating procedure (agenda)
p. Service chiefs should be
ons if they do not understand the
in the technical area.
all times for the action implemented.
that these actions were ever completed.
showed on four separate occasions that
This information was being
Center forms. The information was
planning zone was to be evacuated.
have corrected this error.
boards include completion inwhen advice is received
s did an outstanding job. Datafax traffic was
1 i
and numbering system is too confusing.
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The message form for th~ emergen~y operations center needs to be revised.
If there are two 1dions on one form, such as for radio and facsJ,!Ji IP.,
there is inadequd Li.' space to post the time sent and/or received. f111··
proved identification is needed by players initiating messages. Ti11~y were
simply showing the·county name instead of County/EOC or County/FCP, etc.
0

Suggest attention be given to improving the entire
message center operations for more simplified system
and improved identification.

The runners in charge of duplicating and distribution performed in an
exceptional manner. Amador County could use a copier that collates the
material being duplicated. There was some mechanical difficulty with the·
equipment, but it was repaired·within a short time.
A disproportionate amount of the Emergency Services Director's time was
consumed in monitoring the Unified Dose Assessment Center briefings and
filling out·the briefing forms of the Unified Dose Assessment Center and
the utility emergency operations facility. In addition, some of the technical information presented at the Unified Dose Assessment Center briefings
was difficult for the decision-making staff to digest and interpret.
A staff person with technical training on radiological
health, such as the Radiological Officer, should assist
the decision-making staff with monitoring the information
coming from the Unified Dose Assessment Center.

o

The County's media briefing room would not be adequate to accommodate the
lq,rge number of reporters that could be expected in the event of an emergency at Rancho Seco. The briefing room could accommodate about 50 people.

•

The County of Amador should designate a larger facility as
. the primary or backup media facility.

o .

There were four media briefings conducted. The Public Information Officer
provided information as to the status of the situation within Amador County
only. He referred the media to the news releases posted for Sacramento,
. San Joaquin and the utility. He also gave them the address an.d the telephone number for the emergency news center. The Public Information Officer
did not seem able to handle the questions from the media, but did tell them
he would get the information. At the close of the exercise, the media let
the Public Information Officer know that during an actual emergency, this
procedure would be unacceptable. The Public Information Officer was well
informed in the use of plans and procedures and familiar with both.
0

It is suggested that the Public Information Officer be
further trained in methods to employ for obtaining information in a more expedient manner prior to briefing
the media.

Amador County partially met the objective to demonstrate the ability to
establish traffic control and properly use survey meters {COV 700). Two

··~:
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The functioning of tf,, ')Jcramento e111ergency operations center staff (both
operational and suppor~-~ng) under the leadership of the assigned CoonJinator, was outstanding. Most commendable was the effort to "cross-train"
new and older members of the staff. Everyone used the .Plan as the ba ';is
for their actions. Coordination was consistent throughout th~
exercise.
Particular praise is directed to the activities of the four clerical staff
assigned to message flow management, duplication and delivery. That messages
reached the right places is directly due to their diligent efforts. A new
telecopier system is sorely needed. One individual, by modest estimate,
devoted 65% of the time rewriting blurred messages or making others legible.

•

In Sacramento County, manning of traffic control points was simulated due
to an agreement between the County and the California Highway P~trol.
Barricades were delivered to all locations within the 2-mile emergency
planning zone by County Public Works personnel. Traffic control functions
for Sacramento County are the responsibility of the County Sheriff's Department and the California Highway Patrol. ·The County Sheriff's Department would man the control points initially until the California Highway
Patrol personnel could dispatch to the sites. Traffic control is directed
from the Field Command Post in Wilton. During the exercise the County was
to have staffed one t~affic control point for demonstration ourooses. This
did not occur. Emergency Personnel from the County Department of Public
Works were dispatched to the field to deliver traffic barricades to tne
preselected control points in the 2-mile emergency planning zone. The
personnel were very familiar .with the area of their assigned responsibility
and were knowledgeable~ir;tr~t'leir respective duties. Traffic control point
locations were accurately a'nf(Juickly found and required equipment was
distributed as appropriate. Personnel from the Department of Public Works
were not adequately trained in the proper use of dosimetry. They were
outfitted with a low range and high range self reading pocket dosimeter
but were unfamiliar with significance of readings, proper recording procedures, who to notify in the event of an excessive exposure, and where
to go for decontamination if needed.
0

Improved training systems need to be implemented for
these assigned emergency workers.

San Joaquin County Emergency Operations Center
The County received the initial notification in their 24-hour communications
center. After the emergency operations center became operational, thereceipt of utility notifications was transferred to the emergency operations
center. A communicator continuously manned the emergency phones. When the
Technical Support Center transmitted notifications, this communicator transcribed the information into the proper form.
The County emergency operations center was activated with most staff being
prepositioned (no actual callout). The emergency operations center \'las
<?.Perational at 8:15a.m. and fully staffed by 8:3·J a.m.
·
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ve action decisions after listenbriefings, discussing options and
service chiefs and finally coordicounty decision·makers.
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In the initial phase of the rxorcise, the internal message
flow in the emergency operations center experienced operational problems. Copies of messages were not distributed
to all appropriate officials in a timely manner. It is
suggested that increased training be implemented to improve
this area of the response operations.

0

o

Not all news releases were posted as called for in the
plan. The San Joaquin news releases were approv~d by
the emergency operations center coordinator before release and were eventually posted. News releases received
from other jurisdictions were not posted. Again, increased training of staff assigned to this area to assure
that all news releases (including other jurisdictions) are
posted in a timely manner should be implemented.

San Joaquin County demonstrated an excellent ability to control access
to and evacuate designated areas. When questioned by the evaluator, the
school officials did not know the exact number of children that boarded
the buses, though they did assure the evaluator that each bus had a list
of the children on board and each child did have an emergency card.
The San Joaquin County Field Command Post staff outside the command
vehicle were unaware of the situation at the plant as no status boards
were used or posted. As.late as 12:30 p.m. no briefings had been held.
Officers manning the F,te14iCo,mmand Post heard various events being repO"rted over the radio, but no 'logs· were being maintained. Equipment
(CDV 700) issued to the California Highway Patrol and San Joaquin Sheriff's
personnel assigned to traffic control points were literally unused. The
staff were not informed of equipment use, not trained, and did not know
how to call in readings.
0

Improved training systems need to be implemented for
these assigned emergency workers.

·There were so many individuals within the San Joaquin County Emergency
Operations Center that performed their tasks in an exceedingly above
average manner -- from the Chairman of the Board of Supervisors to the
maintenance workers who kept the pathways clear and the coffee hot -it would be difficult to do justice here. However, the Emergency Services Coordinator and his immediate staff are especially noted for their
attention to preparations and operations for this exercise. The San
Joaquin County play included a great many exercise activities that were
not a part of the scenario, such as the representatives from the Pacific
Gas and Electric Company, Pacific Bell, and a local meteorologist, who
were all provided with unique problem-solving messages throughout the
exercise. The Amateur Radio Emergency Services were also provided an
opportunity to actively participate in special assignments.

·-
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ified Dose Assessment Center were all demanner. The center was activated in a ti~ely
dose calculations and assessment was
Technical Support Center to the Unified Dose
established for the center, other objectives
tions facility apply to the center, since
oper~tions facility.
These objectives,
t, status board posting, in~ernal ommunicarna1 con-:munications \·lith the techniccl support
d monitoring teams, and fi::1d com:;~?.nd :;osv,,
an excellent manner.
es were demonstrated during the center
r Service and Air Resources b0ard
ing their means of 1·e::ric.'inj ob:=:l-vaand satellite pictures using r~~oLe
lite receiving recorders. The weather
nting out specific meteorologic3l paraaffected by the areas real terrain.
field radiation monitoring tearr.s capatives such as perform air sampling was
all teams since they were not re1 teams demonstrated their procedures
detection instruments.
corrective action items dete1·mi nee. The
improvement which might receive action such
ementation of training programs; review and
if necessal·y; and emphasize radiation monitor-ins
suggestions are general and they may not
jurisdiction; thus, the reader will have to
for the Unified Dose Assessment Center
tective Action Recommendations v1ere imtl·teen the infonnation on the t(a.ns-
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the meteorologist participate in ':1 ic:fings to discuss the
historic or specific probability ,,• any wind shifts that
could affect sheltering or evacuation decision-making.
o

•

There is a continuing need for the field radiological monitoring teams to obtain initial training and subsequent refresher courses or participate in regularly scheduled drills.
Several items related to training or familiarity arose
during the exercise, such as:
-The inventory list for the radiation monitoring
kits used-by the Sacramento teams did not contain
check sources. It is; recommended that check
sources be available. In addition the batteries
in a flashlight and a dosimeter charger were weak.
- Potassium Iodide (KI) is available for emergency
workers, but the curre~t procedures should be reviewed to address that option. It is suggested
that the KI should be available in the monitoring
kits. It may not be possible or desirable to have
a monitoring team return to the field command
post and "runners 11 would not be recommended.

I

I

- Techniques for use and interpretation of survey
instruments can only be learned by hands-on-experience.
Also, it is .recommended using meter face drawings to
indicate scenario meter readings rather than reporting
a controller supplied number. Constant attention and
understanding of the radiation units of measurement
must be practiced (millirem per hour vs. microrem per
hour).
- To conserve radio time, the data recording form could
be used for a radio reporting format. This application
will usually prevent having to repeat data or subsequently having to verify data.
- Special vehicles are usually required for travel on
unimproved roads during the area•s rainy season.
If 4 x 4 vehicles are not routinely available, a resource should be developed to provide them when required.
-The procedure for air sampling was followed; however,
the procedures ·do not specify a sample volume, or flowrate and sampling time. A three minute sample at 1.5.
cubic feet per minute would probably not provide the
required sensitivity. The following is offered:
a) Determine the minimum sample volume necessary
to provide an iodine sensitivity of 1 X 101 uCi/cc
using the PRM-6 and HP-260 probe.

lA?.
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It was noted
t all personnel
training in personal
dosimeter use
radia on safety. It was also noted that
the Field Command Po has no emergency power.
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o

No alternate fi d command post site is listed in the
County's plan. To avoid confusion at an alternate site,
it is recommended
t a number
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command post are
and plan implementa on.
gency re~ponse manual
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.Lr'nted good knowledge of pruccdul'e'::,
dosimetry.

,!l :1

The overall operation of the Sacramento Field Command Post was very good.
Management of the San Joaquin Field Command Post was excellent. The manager
coordinated decision with his key staff and the staff worked very well as a
team.·
Amador's Field Command Post staff are to be commended for their professionalism,.
plan knowledge and plan implementation activities during the exercise.

•

The corrective actions that follow in the Findings Matrix are not meant to
detract from the overall outstanding performance of the entire emergency response operations demonstrated. They are considered to be what the Regional
Assistance Committee believe preparedness exercises are conducted to provide-~
areas of weakness that can be corrected to enhance emergency response operations •

•
•
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EVALUATOR($) FINDING

NUREG REF.

Two major general population protective action
decisions were made during the exercise. The ·
appropriate decision-makers from Amador, Sacramento, and San Joaquin Counties participated in
both decisions. The decisions were based on plant
''status and the recommendations of the Unified Dose
Assessment Center and the utility. In both cases,
the protective actions were precautionary and were
not based on actual doses or dose rates. The
plant status was such that there was a potential
for a major release of activity with resultant
doses above the protective action guides. The
decision-makers appropriately decided to take
precautionary protective actions prior to the
actual release of significant amounts of radioactive materials. The decision-makers decided on
what protective actions were to be implemented
and then allowed staff to come to agreement on
the wording of the Emergency Broadcast System
messages to be released to the public. The
protective action decisions were not clearly
described by the prescripted Emergency Broadcast
System messages. They required lengthy discussion
to coordinate the information to be included in
the message.
1.

The staff worked in a businesslike and pro-.
fessional manner during the coordination activity.
It is vital to have Emergency Broadcast System
stations release the same information to the
• The public officials
1 aware of
s necessity.

..

E. 5 &6
App. 3

PROPOSED CORRECTIVE ACTION/DATE
/
Amador County: It seems to the county that this
finding is merely a matter of someone•s interpre~
tation of federal guidance. We believe the
Counties of Amador, Sacramento, and s,::·' ___ ,,in
fully met the Nureg gui~ance criteria
& 6,
ref. App. 3 in relationship to meeting e 15
minute guidance criteria. A coordina
decision
to alert the public-was made and an appropriate
response action was agreed upon and actually implemented within the 15 minutes. That implementation
decision specifically included not taking action
until the-EBS messages were completed to our co.11ec•tive satisfaction and that required an additional
five minutes. We believe that an alerting decision
was made and implemented within the 15 minute
guidance requirement. We further believe that had
a decision been made to implement any given a1
ing action, let's say two hours later, we would
still have met the fifteen minute guidance criteria. Therefore, Amador County rejects this
finding.
Sacramento County: Sacramento County believes that
the 15 minute requirement should be based on those
conditions that exist at the time of the message.
Protective actions that were ordered were precautionary and ·were based on potential e~sures ·
rather than actual exposures. The pub';
ld
not have received any additional expo : e f r·~rn the
time interval in excess of the 15 minute requirement. Sacramento Coun would like to remind FEMA
a PIO Dri 11 was
on
10,
1986, during which the 15 minute requirement was
met. However, we realize that the current EBS
messaQes ar

.11 !D. T.~n T f'Tlrl,tllf·!N.QJ;,OD .. I= ArT I TTV
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oasi

most

rea 1

ways act in a manner
tive

ion

not according to artificial time limits.
County will not in the future discuss the
meet that 0bjective."
and

time elapsed between
protective actions by the
agreement on
decision-makers was in excess of the 15-minute
requirement.

In both cases,

11

[Note: The State did not comment on this corrective action item.]

No additional public exposure would have resulted
from the time interval in excess of the 15-minute
requirement used to modify the Emergency Broadcast
System message. Again, both protective actions
were precautionary and were based on potential
exposures rather than actual exposures.

..

[NOTE: It was suggested to the state and local
offsite jurisdictions during the debriefing that
~n alert and notification system drill, to include simulation of siren activation and dissemination of Emergency Broadcast System messages,
be conducted in the early spring of 1987. The
determination to categorize this finding as a
corrective action was based on the successful
demonstration for meeting the 15-minute timeline
during the Public Information Drill conducted
on July 9, 1986. This was confirmed with the

"'
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Headquarters and the NRC, Region V.]

111DT<::nT

IOD j:"llf'il TTV

All .QEf:SIIE" JURISDICTIONS .
~~"'

·'<

•

•
OFFSITE EXERCISE EVALUATION REPORT
RANCHO SECO NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE
OCTOBER 8, 1986
EXERCISE FINDINGS MATRIX

?'!
;.

$-

.,

"
EVALUATOR(S) FINDING

'

2. The content of Emergency Broadcast System
messages prepared for dissemination to the public
was inadequate. Firstly, as noted above, the
messages required extensive modification for releasing information of the type required to fit
1
the particular situation (precautionary measures).
Either a series of prescripted messages,
addressing every conceivable situation that is
known to be able to arise as a result of a radiological emergency at the Rancho Seco;Nuclear
Generating Station should be developed or a more
efficient form to be completed by radio station
engineers. Secondly, the messages did not include evacuation routes or locations (addresses)
of reception centers. Thirdly, protective action
areas were not described in terms of familiar
landmarks and boundaries. Instead, the public
was instructed to take protective actions if
located within 2-, 5-, or 10-miles of the plant.
Residents and transients within these areas may
not be aware of their distance from the plant
site and therefore would not know whether they
should heed the recommendations or not.

NUREG REF.
E. 7.

PROPOSED CORRECTIVE

ACTION/L~-~

Amador: The County of Amador agrees in concept
with this finding. We realize that the EBS :>?s-,
sages are inadequate in many senses, and th e:r re
intend to coordinate the rewrite of all EBS ssages with the other two counties. We believe thi
action should be completed by June 30, 1987.
The County of Amador disagrees with portions of
this finding which assert public protection areas
should be 11 described in terms of familiar land...:
marks and 6oundaries ... Since we disagree with
this stated interpretation, we will work closely
with FEMA officials during our EBS rewrite activities to assure that our messages meet the letter',
and the intent of the guidance.
·
Sacramento: The three County Coordinators will mee
after the first of the year (January 1987) to rewrite the prescripted EBS Messages. Appropriate
evacuation routes and familiar landmarks and boundaries will ·be reviewed and if deemed appropriate
will be included in our messages. In addition,
the evaluator's findings indicate that we did not
include the addresses of our Reception Centers.
This is an incorrect finding. The Sacramento,.
County emergency messages did include the addre
of both Reception Centers located in Sacramento
County as well as those in Amador County.
San Joaquin: It is agreed that the EBS messages
could be improved. A re-evaluation of the messages will take place in January along with a reevaluation of the Public Protection Areas .
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EVALUATOR($) FINDING

NUREG REF.

1. Actual message center procedures at the
I N.l.a.
Sacramento County Emergency Operations Center
did not follow the most recent written procedures
(issued January 20, 1984). Actual operating
procedures, which worked quite well during the
exercise, directed message center operators to
relay calls requesting actions requiring implementation by functional service chiefs to those
individuals, even if they were not identified by
name by the caller. These new procedures were
established based upon experience gained during
a recent flooding emergency and difficulties
experienced during a recent practice drill for
a nuclear pmver plant emergency. Existing
written procedures only call for the relaying of
calls to service function chiefs if they are
identified by name by the caller, with·other
action requests requiring a written message to be
developed by the message center operator. In
this message, ·the operator would attempt to describe the needed action, and give the message to
the message center supervisor for numbering and
distribution.

PROPOSED CORRECTIVE ACTION/DATE

The discrepancy between actual Message Center
procedures and our written procedures will be
rectified during our next plan update in 1937.

N

0>

~~....-r:••w ..... ,....,~..

;w:a:A«~Will

--"''-7'""''-~~,%~

Un'\T.C:JUJ"TTJ'\111cfND:Jmt .. ~.At'T.J TTV

SA.t;~~l}>~ll'

27
ISE EVALUATION REPORT
LEAR GENERATING STATION\
PREPAREDNESS EXE ISE
8' 1986
luation Activities Undertaken by the
and Regional Assistance Committee,
ty Draft Emergency Response Plan was
before the guidance was published and
application of the newly developed
Plan was adopted by the County on
ew or approval of the Federal Emergency
si
Committee, Region IX).
ical Emergency Response Plan was offion October 18, 1983. It has not been
Emergency Management Agency/Regional
Response Plan has not been
t
submitted for review by the
Agency/Regional Assistance Committee,
o1ogica1 emergency response plans
assigned to the exercises noted below.]
was conducted on September 16, 1981.
Management Agency/Regional Assistance
fullscale exercises conducted
1 . A limited exercise conducted
luated by the Federal Emergency Managettee, Region IX. Evaluator findings
to by the offsite jurisdictions
or disallowed by the offsite jurisdicsiren demonstration and public telephone
2, 1985. The system was approved by
Agency on August 29, 1986.
was provided to the Sacramento
jurisdictions on March 26, 1986.
been disseminated by the Sacramento
ts within the ten-mile emergency plan-
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SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT
RANCHO SECO
1986 EMERGEN(Y PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE
. OBJEC;;Vf:_S

AND

GUIDELINES

General objectives and guidelines have been developed for the 1986 Emergency
Preparedness Exercise scheduled to be conducted on October 8, 1986.
Participants \n this exercise include the Sacramento Municipal Ut\lity
District <SMUD>. the counties of Amador, Sacramento and San Joaquin and the
California Office of Emergency Services <OES>.
The "extent of play" by exercise participants is listed below each objective.
If nothing \s listed below the objective, all players should respond according
to the Emergency Plan.
l
• 19

A.

•
'

EXERCISE OBJECTIVES - ONSITE
1.

Control Room
a.

Demonstrate the proficiency of Control Room staff to recognize and
classify an emergency condition.
~

A second shift of Operations staff will participate throughout
the exercise and will interface with Technical Support Center
<TSC> staff <AP 501, Recognition and Classification of
Emergencies>. The second shift staff will be pre-positioned.
''

".b. Demonstrate timely notification to federal, state and local
authorities in a timely manner.
-

Perform notification, AP 506, Notification/Communication.

c. Demonstrate the transfer of responsibilities from the Control Room
staff to the TSC staff.
- Transfer of responsibilities to the TSC will occur at the ALERT
Level. Operations staff will continue to participate.

•
d.

'•1

t

Demonstrate the ability to establish and maintain emergency
communications links.

ATTACHMENT B

!
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analyze current plant conditions and
potenti 1 consequences.

t!mely and appropriate

lve Action Guide.
2.

Technical Support Center <TSC), and Plant Assembly Point <PAP>

a.

to activate and operate the TSC and PAP.
ion and Operation of the TSC and
ion of PAPs.
establish and maintain emergency
gather, assess, and dtssemfnate
conditions and the emergency response
the TSC and PAP staffs, 1n conjunction
• to coordinate activ1ties to simulate
stable condition.
yze current plant conditions and
potent1al consequences.
TSC and PAP staffs to direct and
radiological monitoring teams. Teams
ite surveys and provide this
Logi 1cs Coordinator.
1o1ogfca1 Monitoring, and AP 508,
ing. Some simulation of actions
repeated air sampling.
rform offsite dose a~sessment
ons. as appropriate.
1culation.

30
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h. Demonstrate the abiltty to perform timely assessment of
radiological and plant conditions to support the formula.tion of
appropriate prot~ct1ve action recommendation~.

·-:

-

Perform AP 528, Protective Action Guide.

1. Demonstrate the ability to control the exposure of emergency
workers.
- Perform AP 515, Emergency Personnel Dosimetry.
j.

Demonstrate the transfer of responsibilities from the TSC staff to
the EOF staff.

k. Demonstrate the ability to keep emergency logs.
1.

Demonstrate the ability to inform plant staff of emergency events
and safety information.

3. Security
a. Demonstrate the ability to control access to the site and
emergency centers.
- Security will control access to the Control Room, TSC, and
PAP. Initial security measures will be performed with play
reduced later in the exercise.
. ','•.

B.

•

...

EXERCISE OBJECTIVES - OFFSITE ·
1.

Emergency Operations Facility <EOF>:
a. Demonstrate the ability to activate and operate the EOF.
-

•

b.

Perform AP 506.02, Activation and Operation of the EOF and
AP 554, Activation and Operation of UDAC .

Demonstrate the coordination between SMUD, the counties, and the
state in decisionmaking.

c. Demonstrate the ability to establish and maintain appropriate
communications links.

31
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facilities and di plays to support
recommendations tn accordance with
emergency activitles.
the EOF for making recommendations to
onmaktng.
on to County decisfonmakers for
il ty of County Liaisons to relay county

staff.
EOF telecopier system between all offsite
the ability of telecopier/
dtsseminate all transmissions in a timely

to prepare press releases and coordinate
between the counties, state and SMUD
on equipment.
lease of Information to the Public.
discussion between decisionmakers to determine
controlled recovery and reentry.

coordinate radiological and
obtain data from the TSC and Radiation
data to perform dose projections.
Dose Calculation.
deploy and obtain field data from
teams
ams
2 ams.
provide input to EOF briefings <using
) including field data, meteorological
ions for protective actions.
efing Forms as stated in AP 506.02 and AP

4

•

,)

e. Demonstrate the ability to distribute EOF Briefing Forms to
personnel at the EOF and County Emergency Operations Centers CEOC>
prior tc briefings.
·, 3.

Emergency N'·'!.~ ....center <ENC>
a. Demonstrate the ability to activate and operate the ENC.
- Perform AP 556, Activation and Operation of the ENC.
will be pre-positioned.

ENC staff

b. Demonstra.te the ability to establish and maintain appropriate
communication links.
- Receive press releases via telecopy and post all releases.
c. Demonstrate the ability to schedule and conduct news conferences
to include answering technical questions.
d.

Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control in·
a coordinated fashion.

e. Demonstrate coordinated news conferences including all
participating agencies.
4. Security
a.
. ·'

~

.....

Demonstrate the ability to control access to the EOF and ENC.
- Use badging system to maintain appropriate accountability .

:

.· ·•.J'i'

5. Amador, Sacramento-and San Joaquin Counties

•

a.

Demonstrate ability to receive notification at their EOCs from
Control Room/TSC, using appropriate forms .

b.

Demonstrate the ability to activate and operate the Eocs· and Field
Command Posts <FCPs>.
- Staff will be pre-positioned.

•-

c.

Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, displays and equipment to
support emergency operations.

d.

Demonstrate the ability to adequately communicate with appropriate
locations and organizations.

e.

Demonstrate the ability of public officials to determine
.
appropriate protective actions for the Public Protection Areas.

f.

Demonstrate the ability of public officials to coordinate
protective actions and emergency activities.

f\

'i:
e

'

'

11:1

'
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:s completed, demonstrate the ability

na~e

the implementation of protective

of sirens, the activation of
s

and the activation of the Emergency
sultlng 1n a test of the system itself.

the counties to activate and utilize
fc1pate at their EOC, FCP and the EOF.
11

icipate at the EOF and limited play

of the counties to provide prompt
information to the media with each

6.

set up and staff the FCP, including
sonnel. mainta1ning security and badging
status boards and use of maps. plus
nt<s> and issue COV 700s to all traffic
trate their proper use.
two <2> Radiological Monitoring teams
routes.
the following:

s and interviews.

lie information and press releases
y of county-specific actions.

provide security at the EOC and FCP.
OES Director or Coordinator to
ice chiefs, and for the FCP Commander to

and activate the EOC and FCPs.
nto County will be simulated.

...

b.

Demonstrate the capabtltty to provide prompt warning to the·,publ\c
and special facilities- notification to the EBS stations,
sounding of sirens, and prompt delivery of messages.

c.

Demons~rcJ.te

the abll1ty of Sacramento County to provide prompt
coordino.tion of emergency informat1on to the med1a 1n ace 1ance
w1th plans.

d.. Demonstrate the ability to make decisions and to coordinate
emergency activities.
e.

Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to
establish appropriate access control points. Road blocks to be
placed on side of road at one location.

f .. Demonstrate the ability of County plume monitoring personnel to
respond in accordance with plans.
g. Demonstrate the ability to control the radiological exposure of
emergency workers.
h.
8.

1

Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control in
a coordinated fashion.

San Joaquin County
a.

Demonstrate the capability to provide prompt warning to the
general public using the EBS system and sirens.
Simulated broadcast of EBS messages to coincide with EBS
station t~S'f:~sJ gna 1.·
··>"·"·.·

....

;" -~.·.

>

,:·:~~,~~i;~:~?~··:

"

- The s1reris will· btf sounded.
b.

Demonstrate the ability to provide prompt coordination of
emergency information to the media according to plan pr~cedures.
-. Simulated press releases.
- Actual press will be given special tours, outside of the
scenario, to allow them and the public to view County
operations.

c.

Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control tn
a coordinated fashion.

d.

Demonstrate the ability of County plume monitoring personnel to
respond in accordance with plans.
- Two monitoring teams and support personnel wi 11 be mobi 1ized.

e.

Demonstrate the ability to control the radiological exposure of
emergency workers.

f.

organizational ability and resources necessary to
iate access control points.
i11 be established.

I

I

lity to perform personnel monitoring at the

~~·'

l~

i:i;'

a.

ability to staff the EOF with the EOF Liaison,
1o1ogica1 Health Branch personnel and Public
ce <PIO> staff and for them to perform their

r
I

will be pre-positioned.
b.

ability to staff and activate the State Operations
limited staff.

ll
I

1nclude ,the Emergency Director, Chief of Staff,
rectot, PIO and State Dose Assessment Center
c.

d.

lity to answer inquiries from the Governor•s
ab11\ty of SOC staff to receive, understand, and
data and advise personnel of significance.
11ty of SOC staff to tdent1fy and seek
to erroneous data, rumors, and unexpected
· agencies.

f.

lity to mobilize and activate the SDAC.

g.

iltty of the SDAC staff to receive and interpret

h.

iltty of the State PIO to establish and maintain
county PIOs.

11ity of PIOs to understand technical data and
press releases.
ility to provide prompt coordination of
ion
the media.
Exercise Detail portion of this report, the
the State of California were developed for
cipating in the exercise for training

.)

'

SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT
RANCHO SECO

.e .

1986

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE
SCENARIO

A.

•

NARRATIVE SUMMARY
Initial conditions are that Rancho Seco has been operating at 1001 power
and has been at this power level for the previous forty <40> days. Core
age is 300 Effective Fuel Power Days CEFPD> on Cycle 7. One of the
Reactor Building spray pumps has failed its surveillance test run on swing
shift the previous day. · The problem was high vibration. Maintenance
support was called in on midshift. The pump and motor are presently
disconnected. Repairs are expected by 1600. No other major components
are out of service and no testing is in progress. Fuel 1s being
re-arranged in the Spent Fuel Building.
The first event is that a spent f~el assembly is damaged and a small
amount of radioactive gases are released. An ALERT should be declared.
later, the Control Room receives high vibration alarms on the "A" Reactor
Coolant Pump <RCP>. Minutes later, the 11 A11 RCP suffers impeller and pump
casing damage. The pump trips and causes a reactor trip. Pump debris is
carried into the core where structural damage to many fuel rods occurs.
Gas gap fission products are released into the reactor·coolant. letdown
radiattoo.monttors are both tn high alarm indicating fuel damage. Many
rods fafl to fully tnsert"op.Jhe trip due to the damaged fuel assemblies.
The reactor 1s shutdown but:,:1t is questionable as to the shutdown margin
;"'f the core.
'f

One hour later, there is a double-ended
shear of the reactor coolant cold
leg piping at the·dtscharge of the 11 A11 RCP. The top of the core is
uncovered for a few seconds but no cladding damage occurs from overheating
because the reactor is shutdown. There ts no hydrogen generation. Some
fuel cladding damage does occur as a result of the rapid depressurization
of the Reactor Coolant System <RCS) and fission products are released into
the coolant and out the break into the Reactor Building. The Safety
Features System initiates. All emergency cooling pumps start and provide
sufficient core cooling. A combination of failures disables all emergency
systems designed for Reactor Building cooling.
A SITE AREA EMERGENCY should be declared.
A few hours later, the Auxiliary Building stack monitors alarm due to a
breach of containment. Reactor Building pressure is still high so the
potential exists for the release of large amounts of radioactivity to the
atmosphere.
A GENERAL EMERGENCY should be declared.

37

ease of radioactivity continues until the Reactor Building pressure
atmospheric pressure due to the flow out the
and to cooling from the normal coolers 7 At this point,
probL:ms, the RCS becomes saturated for·a short
y from the Spent Fuel Pool is aligned. Low
on emergency sump rectrculation is eventually established
11y
rable tra1n of long term cooling.
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Federal Emergency Managernent Agency
\\'ashington, D.C. 20472

Ju 1y 15 , 1985
GUIDANCE MEMORANDUM EX-1
REMEDIAL EXERCISES
Purpose
This Guidance Memorandum provides criteria and procedures for requiring and
scheduling remedial exercises and other remedial actions to correct deficiencies
identified in exercises to test State and local radiological emergency response
plans. It also provides guidance for determining the extent of participation in
remedial exercises.
Background
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA} rule, 44 CFR 350, and the
Nuclear Regul.atory Commission {NRC) rule, 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, require
that State and local governments participate in periodic, joint exercises
with utilities. These rules require remedial exercises and other corrective
measures if the results of these exercises do not give reasonable assurance
that adequate protective measures can be taken in the event of a radiological
emergency or the deficiencies identified are significant enough to impact
on the public health and safety. The NRC rule (10 CFR 50, Appendix E,
IV.f.4.) calls for NRC-FEMA consultation in making a determination as to
·whether a remedial exercise is needed. The FEMA rule (44 CFR 350.9.c.5)
leaves the determination of the participation required from State and local
governments to the appropriate FEMA Regional Director.

•

~

I

For the purpose of exercise assessment, FEMA uses an evaluation method to apply
the criteria of NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1.* FEMA classifies exercise inadequacies
as deficiencies or areas requiring corrective actions. Deficiencies are
demonstrated and observed inadequacies that would cause a finding that offsite
emergency preparedness· was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that
appropriate protective measures can be taken to protect the health and safety
of the public living in the. vicinity of a nuclear power facility in the event
of radiological emergency. Because of the potential impact of deficiencies
on emergency preparedness, they are required to be promptly corrected through
appropriate remedial actions including remedial exercises, drills or other
actions. Areas reauiring correct~ve act~ons are demonstrated and observed
1nadequacies of State and local government performance, and although their
correction is required during the next scheduled biennial exercise, they are
not considered, by themselves, to adversely impact public health and safety.
In addition to these inadequacies, FEMA identifies areas recommended for
* The metnod currently 1n use is incorporated in the August 5, 1983, memoranaum
from the FEMA Deputy Associate Director of State and Local Programs and
Support to the FEMA Regional Directors, subject: "Procedural Policy on
Radiological Emergency Preparedness, Plan Reviews, Exercise Observations and
Evaluation, and Interim Findings."
ATTACHMENT C
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1''rn areas observed during an exercise that are
Wh i 1e not
~level of

e 1y i r:1 pact pub 1i c he ,:J 1 t h and safe t y •
these would enhance·"' :)rCJanint:::,,'

11

a s

used in determining the need for requiring a

one or more of the following planning standards of
EP-1 will require a remedial exercise. Exceptions
rement may be made when correction of deficiencies can
strated
other remedial actions.

1.

ponsibility (Organization Control) (A);
cation Methods and Procedures (E);

i

i cations ,(F) ;

0
0

ion and Information (areas related to emergency
on) (G);

sessment (including field monitoring and radiological
(I);

s

se (including evacuation and other protection
decisionmaking) (J);
ure Control (K); and
c Health Support and Services (L).

2

ion
be required when areas requiring corrective
raise doubts as to whether adequate protective
in the event of an emergency.

Procedures for Reporting on the Need for and Scheduling of Remedial Actions
nt exercise indicates that there is the potential
ion, the following procedures will be followed.
1.

2

ce will immediately notify FEMA Headquarters, by
at re of exercise inadequacies~ FEMA Headquarters
and discuss these inadequacies with NRC Headquarters.
fice will promptly initiate a consultation process
the Regional Assistance Committee(s) (RAC), the
arters for these purposes: (a) To classify
uac es, (b) to specify appropriate remedial actions,
exercises, drills, or other actions, for both
iring corrective actions and (c) to determine
reas r
are to
involved in remedial actions. During
ters will continue to consult with NRC Headquarters.
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·~

,

3.

Within 30 days of the exercise, the FEMA Region will transDit a letter
and draft report consisting of, at least, a summary table of the
exercise inrHiequacies to thr <;tate(s) with a copy .to FEHA Ht:adquarter·s
and the RAC( s). The letter .Iii•! summary tJh 1r· wi 11' confirm the results
of the consultations with ti1c SLdte(s). The State will be asked to
use this letter and summary table ·of exercise inadequacies as a basis
·--···for working with the FEMA Region in .accomplishing the remedial
actions.
.

..

•

4.

Within 60 days from the exercise, the FEMA Region will prepare and
transmit copies of the exercise report to the State{s), RAC(s) and FEMA
Headquarters. If the remedial exercise or other remedial actions
have been taken and evaluated prior to the end of the 60 day period, the
FEMA Region will incorporate its evaluation of these actions within the
exercise report. (In this case, the report will be completed and forwarded
within 30 days of the remedial exercise or other remedial actions.) ·

5.

FEMA Headquarters will forward a copy of the exercise report to NRC
Headquarters within 10 days of receipt from the FEMA Regional Office.

6.

If the remedial exercise or other remedial actions are not conducted
prior to the preparation and forwarding of the exercise report, they
should be completed as soon ~s possible but not later than 60 days after
the report is forwarded to FEMA Headquarters.

7.

8.

.i

·~

y

If the evaluation of the remedial exercise or other remedial actions
are not incorporated into the exercise report, the FEMA Regional Office
will prepare and forward an evaluation report of these remedial actions
to the State(s), RAC(s) and FEMA Headquarters within 30 days of the
conduct of their completion.
FEMA Headquarters will forward a copy of the remedial action evaluat~on
report to NRC Headquarters within 10 days of receipt from the FEMA Regional
·Office.

J

Extent of Participation

•

The extent of State and· local government participation in a remedial exercise
shall be determ~ned by the FEMA Regional Director. Some factors to consider in
this determination incl~de:

.. 1

.I

1.

The remedial exercise should address only those activities that are necessary ·
to demonstrate correction of the identified deficiencies.
.~

2.

To the extent possible, the remedial exercise participation should be
limited to organizations having the deficiency(ies).

3.

When the corrective action by one organization cannot be demonstrated
without involvement of other organizations, their participation should
be at a level necessary to confirm the corrective action. This includes
participation by utilities which should be arranged through the
appropriate NRC Regional Administrator.

I

I
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d Remed; t~l

are

-

Exercises

~.!.Jl exercise indicates that an _organization did not
orrection of identif1ed deficiencies, one· of the
taken.

s not approved offsite planning and preparedness for the
site
r 44 CFR 350, FEMA may, in consultation with NRC,
ot r remedial exercise and the NRC may consider enforcement
offsite planning and preparedness for the involved
350, FEMA may initiate steps to withdraw the 350
e another remedial exercise under the provision of
NRC may consider enforcement actions.

is

dance

um has been prepared in coordination with the NRC staff.

.

.

...

.
•
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· OFFSITE EXERCISE EVALUATION REPORT
RANCHO SECO NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION'
EMEHC; : '( PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE
OCTOBER 8, 1986
EVALUATOR ROSTER
EVALUATOR

FACILITY

Kent Prendergast, RAC/NRC (Subs.)
Nicholas B. Nikas, FEMA/RIX

Emergency Operations Facility

•

PIO Coordination
County Liaison Activity

Joseph D. Dominguez, FEMA/RIX
Anna Hart, RAC/USDA

Amador Emergency Operations Center·

Suzanne Mooney, FEMA/RIX
Ken Lerner, ARGONNE

Field Command Post

Paul Lynch, RAC/DOI (Subs.}

Sacramento. Emergency Operations Center
Field Command Post

Lyle Slagle, INEL

i$i~';{·.:,,,:,;.-:i~l~~~n Joaquin Emergency Operations Center
;:,~.~ ·~ ~,Y;

, :) .:· ·:

~;~f:.!~!\'

'·

.

_.... Field Command Post

····~;Emergency

i.~

Susan Elkins, FEMA/RIX
Joe Keller, INEL
Don Fingleton, ARGONNE

News Center

Verne Paule, FEMA/RIX

Unified Dose Assessment Center

•

John Robinson, FEMA/RIX
Ken Bertram, ARGONNE

David L. Duncan, RAC/EPA
Walt Strach, RAC/NWS
Manley Wu, FEMA/RIX

'· . Radiological Field Monitoring Teams
.' .... ~~I

-

Amador County (2 teams)

Chuck Taylor, RAC/DOE
Nate Chipman, INEL

Sacramento County (2 teams)

Ken Miles, RAC/FDA
Brad Salmonson, INEL

San Joaquin County (2 teams)

,

Dale Stevenson, RAC/FDA
Jim Opelka, ARGONNE

Communications

Hal Aldrich, FEMA/RIX
Stan Harter, CA-OES
Bob Krueger, CA-OES

Transportation

Ed Henry, RAC/DOT
Pete Sill, FRPCC
Bill Gasper, ARGONNE

'

1
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ITE EXERCISE EVALUATION REPORT
SECO NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION.
PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE
ER 8, 1986
SEQUENCE O.F EVENTS
on of the scenario was based on the utility and
ju sdictions to begin at approximately 8:00 a.m.
in a prepositioned status. The utility amended
exercise to effect their operations beginning at
la
at 5:40a.m. The state and local offsite
8:
a.m. beginning point, prepositioned. These
inated and approved by the Federal Emergency ManageUnited States Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
EVENT

Site Area
9:00 a.m.

General
10:30 a.m.

Termination
2:30 p.m.

-------~-------------~--~------------------------------------------------------

9:10a.m.

10:39 a.m.

2:21 p.m.

9:26 a.m.*

10:40 a.m.*

2:14 p.m.*

9:10a.m.

10:38 a.m.

2:21 p.m.

9:13 a.m.

10:43 a.m.

2:30 p.m.

at the utility emergency operations
operations center notification can appear
on the situation at that time.
mes shown for termination of the exercise occurs
ons centers monitoring of emergency operations
nating in advance of the actual notification from

i1i

ATTACHMENT E

·-

.
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...
CORRESPONDING .
PART(S) OF FORM

OBJECTIVE
Demonstrate ability to mobilize
staff and activate facilities
promptly.

EOC Sec. I
EOF Sec. I
MEDIA Sec. I
RELOC Sec. I
!!:!_ Sec. I

E.l, E.2

2.

Demonstrate ability to fully
staff facilities and maintain
staffing around the clock.

EOC Sec. I
EOF Sec. I
M.EDL\ Sec. I
RELCC Sec. I

A.2.a,
A.4

3.

Demonstrate ability to make
decisions and to coordinate
emergency activities.

EOC Sec. II

A.l.d,
A.2.a

4.

Demonstrate adequacy of facilities
and displays to support emergency
operations.

1.

•1

ECC Sec. III

G. 3. a,

Eo'f Sec. II
MEDL-\. Sec. II

H.2,
H.3

Demonstrate ability to coomunicate
with all appropriate locations,
organizations, and field personnel •.

EOC Sec. IV
EOF Sec. III
'M'EDL-\ Sec. III
RELOC Sec. III
FA Sec. I, II
FM Sec. IV

F

6.

Deconstrate ability to mobilize
and deploy fie~d monitoring
teams in a timely fashion.

FM Sec. I

E.2, I.8

7.

Demonstrate appropriate equipment
and procedures for deter:ining
ambient radiation levels.

FM Sec. II, III

I.8, I.ll

8.

Demonstrate appropriate equipnent
and procedures for measurement of
airborne radioiodine concentrations
as low as 10- 1 uCi/CC in the
presence of noble gases.

FM Sec. II, III
RADL~ Sec. I, II

I.9

9.

Demonstrate appropriate equipcent
and procedures for collection,
transport and analysis of samples
of soil, vegetation, snow, water,
and ill.ilk.

!!:!_ Sec. II, III
RA.DL\B Sec. I, II

I.8

5.

,

,..

ATTACHMENT F

.·
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CORRESPOND r;c
PART(S) OF F'),'::

to project:
via plume
and

1

to project:
via ingestion
based ·on field

12.

to implement
for
tion

NUREG -D 6 54

ECC Sec. V
EOF Sec. XI

I.lO, J.lO.m ·

EOC Sec. V
Sec. VI

I.lO, J.ll

EOC Sec. VII.C

J.9, J.ll

EOC Sec. VI
u-see. III

E.6

EOC Sec. VI

E.5

EOC Sec. VII.A
~Sec. I

J.9, J.lO.g

EOC Sec. VILA
~Sec. I

J.lO.k

EOC Sec. VILA

J.lO.j

E'CiF

-·
1

::ationa.l
necessary
evacuated

FA Sec. I

)

CORRESPONDING
OBJECTIVE

PART(S) OF FOrui

Nli ;U::G

',•

18.

Demonstrate the organizational
ability and resources necessary
to effect an orderly evacuation
of mobility-impaired individuals
within the plume EPZ .. ·

EOC. Sec. VII.B
FA Sec. II.B

J.lO.d

19.

Demonstrate the o~ganizational
ability anc resources necessary
to effect an orderly evacuation
of schools within the plume EPZ •

EOC Sec. VII.B·
FA""'sec. ILA

J.9, J.lo.g·

20.

Demonstrate ability to continuously
monitor and control emergencr
worker exposure.

EOC Sec. VIII
f:A"'Sec. IV
FM Sec. V

K.3.a,

EOC Sec. V

J.lO.f

.

21. ·Demonstrate the abilty to make the
decision, based on predetermined
criteria, whether to issue KI to
. emergency workers and/or the general
population.

22.

23.
P•

'

D~monstrate the ability to supply
and ad:ninister K.I, once the decision
has be~n made to ido ... so
'

'

,.

,.

'

...

.

~:'::.

'

Demonstrate abillt'y 'to effect an
orderly evacuation. of 'onsite
personnel.

24 • . Demonstrate ability to brief the
media in a clear, accurate and
timely manner.

25.

Demonstrate ~bility to provide
advance coordination o·f infor.::Lation
released.

EoF Sec. VI

EOC Sec. VIII
FA'sec.

rv

FM Sec. V
-rEOC Sec. VII. B

EOC Sec. IX

MEiriA Sec. rv

-EOF Sec.

J.lO.e

J.2

G.3.a
G.4.a

IV

EOC Sec. LX:
Sec. IV

G.4.b

MEDL-\

26.

Demonstrate ability to establish
and operate rumor control in a
coordinated fashion.

EOF Sec. II
'i1EDIA Sec. VI

G.4.c

27.

Demonstrate adequacy o~ procedures
for registration and radiological
monitoring of evacuees

RELOC Sec. II

J.l2

28.

Demonstrate adequacy of facilities
for mass care of evacuees.

RELOC Sec. III

J.lO.h

b
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CORRESPONDI~G

PART (S) OF FOR...'i.f

need

reloo te to

DECON all

K. 5.a, b

MEDIC Sec. I I I

L.4

MEDIC Sec. I I

L.l

(to be developed)

C.l.a, b

(to be developed)

H..2, H3

EOC Sec. V

M.4

EOF/EOC.

EOF Sec. VI
EOC Sec. X
ree.nt.ry.

H..l

Federal Emergency Management Agency
Washington, D.C. 204:72

GUIDANCE MEMORANDUM PR-1

CCT

l985

POLICY ON NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1
AND 44 CFR 350 PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS
Purpose
Thi~

Guidance Memorandum (GM) provides interpretation and clarification of
req irements contained in the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
ru~~. 44 CFR 350, and NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, re1ated to periodic planning
a·, exercise a~tivities and other requirements affected by the biennial
l
~rcise frequency and other REP program emphases.
8ackQround

..

,._ r ... ~"''

With the publication of the final 'FEMA rule, 44 CFR 350, on September 28, 1983,
and the the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) final regulation, 10 CFR 50,
on July 6, 1984, it has become necessary to clarify some of the requirements
contained in these rules and our common gui-danc.e:... cri t:eria.:..."tioc.l.llllent, NUREG-0654
/FEMA-REP-1. Also, as we are approaching the:.. fffttT jem-·.a£-""t:tre!: i.mpleentat.io.n
of our joint (NRC/FEMA) radiological emergeney prepared'rTes~..:('R'EY} p~a:X;:--· ·
it is appropriate to highlight and clarify requirements rel ated.:· ..ta.:~dic
assessments, especially those made in the~fifth and sixth year of a State's
REP program.
·
.

Guidance
The changes and program emphases related to the referenced planning standards
and evaluation criteria of NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 and 44 CFR 350 are addressed
to State and local ·governments and to Federal reviewers of plans and preparedness. This guidance is divided into three ·s'ections. Section A contains
planning standards, evaluation criteria and other REP program requirements
that have been revised and/or clarified to facilitate compliance. Section B
include_s those which remain unchanged but are highlighted here to ensure
comple·tion and compliance. Section C describes the Annual Letter of
·Certification which is submitted by the State to the FEMA Regional Director
documenting actions taken on the requirements presented in sections A and B.
SECTION A: THE FOLLOWING
REQUIREMENTS
PLANNING
N.

EVALIIATIO~

ST~NDARD.S

CRITERIA INCLUDE CHANGES FROM EXISTING

AND EVALUATION CRITERION

Exercises and Drills
Planninq Standard

Periodic exercises are (will be) conducted to evaluate major portions of
emergency response capabilities, periodic drills are (will be) conducted to
develop and maintain key skills. and deficiencies identified as a result of
exercises and drills are {will be) corrected. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, p.71}.
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of State and lor.a1.personne1 and
il ity to respond to an accident
r1i ation shall provide for· a crit' ;::,·
eral and State observers/eva1uatoro.
om exercise to exercise year ta year such
ans and preparedness organizations are
od. Each o anization should make
e:OO

resses several periodic exercise requirements~
fied. The most important change is to permit
preparedness elements within a six rather
remaining exercise requirements are placed

exercise r~rements, State---ami:·1oc.a1
requirements:

a ted to ·ttie- six-year compliance ~rioct far-delineated in N.l.b. above. the six-year
of
first joint (utility and State
conducted after November 3, 1980, the
atory Commission Finai Regulations
rt 50 (Appendix E) (45
55410.
e, if the date of the first joint exercise
the six-year period is March 23, 1987.
s are to be tested within the six-year period
ingestion-related elements as the
not tied to a particular site for State
Criteria 3 below.)
rcises should be sufficiently varied so
ements of the plans and preparedness of offsite
thin a six-year period. The major elements
are incorporated in the 35 exercise objectives
983, memorandum: "Procedural Policy on
paredness Plan Reviews. Exercise Observations
e im Findings."
requirement for eacn
~~::..:...;:;.::;._.....J;...;___:_~:::_:_:;:.:.:..:.__;,;_:...:.:.:..:...:..:__:_::..::......::::..:::..:...:::.::.:....:.. t 0 f u 11 y

a in NUREG-0554/FEMA-REP-1, the new language is
is lined t
ugh.

·.

...
exercise its pldn·; and prcp<~redness related to ingestion exposu:··:'
pathway measures nt least once every six years in conjunction with a
plume exposure pathway exercise for some site feF tAat si\ea This
requirement is reflected in the 35 exercise objectives and is
presented in 44 CFR 350.9(c)(4). Each State with ingestion exposure
pathway responsibilities for two or more sites located within its
borders will fully participate at some site on a rotationa1 basis and
partially participate at the other sites once every six years. A
State which has ingestion related responsibilities for a site(s)
located within its borders and which is also within the 50-mile
ingestion exposure pathway of a site(s) located in a bordering
State(s), shall partially participate in all of the ingestion
related e~ercises for those bordering State site{s). For those
States that do not have a power plant located in its borders, but
are located within the 50-mile Emergency Planning Zone of a hordering·
State's power plant, they should fully participate in at least one
exercise over a six-year period and partially participate in all
others. These ingestion-related requirements represent revision
of provisions contained in both ~UREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 and 44 CFR
350.9(c)(4}.

•

The definition of full participation in ingas.tton·.·aspects of exercises
is guided by 44 CFR 350.2(j). Since 1ocal.qovernmem:s are·not usually
required to develop and test ingesticrn plans anct·prepaid~~. State
officials would be the emergency personrrel primarily involved tn the
ingestion portion of exercises. Howe>ter,. in some-States, local
governments hav,e. responsibilities
that• require:.t:treir· participation in
'··:-i'. '
.
such.e~ercisE!~,i,~J~~~'\h.~~rymber and funct1?n of ~ersonnel nee1ed should be
suff1c1ent for carry1ng out all those 1ngest1on measures that are
necessitated by a particular accident scenario. Also, organizations
fully participating in the ingestion portion of an exercise should
deploy field teams to secure and analyze media samples as required by
the accident scenario.
,it·!'!'.f ~p~

"'-·:··

5.

•

6.

:··

~

The definition of partial participation in ingestion aspects of exercises
is guided by 44 CFR 350.2(k). As stated in item 4 above. State officials·.:
.. would be the emergency personnel primarily involved in the ingestion
portion of exercises. The number and function of State personnel needed
should be determined on the basis of verifying capabilities for carrying
out the following responsibilities: Direction and control and related
communications for protective action decisionmaking and dissemination
of emergency information to appropriate individuals, groups and the
general public. Organizations partially participating in the
ingestion portion of an exercise will not have to deploy field teams
to secure and analyze media samples as such sections can be simulated.
Offsite organizations should make provision to start an exercise
between 6:00 p.m. and 4:00 a.m. once every six years •

..

51
·' 7.

8.

anizations should schedule• exercises at different seasor:s
riod to increas tr•e likelihoorl for exercising under
conditions. This i,~.Jvision can be fu1fi1led through the
i
of exercises ar,.: ''1 cDnjunction with it.ems 2 and 3

anizations should make prov1s1on to participate in
exercises at least once every six years. An unarinounvi
exercise is a
ar1y scheduled exercise in which the ·knowledge
· t
teo the exercise is restricted to only those person·
to know. Although the knowledge of the exact date is
a time frame of 7 days within which the unannounced
to
conducted will be established and known to a11

9.

8 may be combined in the same exercise or addressed.
ses

SECT

thin a six-year period.

OTHER PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS HIGHLIGHTED TO CALL ATTENTION TO THE
NEED FOR COMPLIANCE *
STANDARDS AND EVALUATION CRITERIA
.. ...
,·: . . .•. ..: .·...·. "' .....
~

f.

"":"'

-·· . I

Planninq

Standa~d

· ..

communication'!>·C.:ff!ong principal response organizations
the public.·· (NUREG-0554/FEMA-REP-1, p.47)

11 conduct periodic testing of the entire emergency

ev

uation criteria N.2.a., N.2.d. and Appendix 3.)

G.
Planning Standard

e to the public on a periodic basis on how they
their initial actions should be in an emergency
c broadcast station and remaining indoors), the
contact
th the news media for dissemination of information
nc1uding the physical location or locations) are established
es
r coordinated dissemination of information to the

(NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, p.49)

..

zation shall provide a coordinited periodic {at least annu~lly}
in rmation to the public regarding how they will be notifi~
ac ions should be in an emergency. This information shall
ari1y be limited to:
rmation on radiation;
t ona1 in nnation;
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,.
'

d.

l

•

.'' 1ltect ive me.Jsur·es, e.g., eva, 11 ·: 1 'fl routes ~nd rel'ocat1on centt~rs,
_;heltering, respiratory protect1u::, radioprotective drugs; andspecial needs of the handicapped.

Means for accomplishing this dissemination may include, but not necessarily
.limited to:. information in the telephone book, periodic information in utility
bills and publications distributed on an annual basis.
G.2 •. The public information program shall provide the permanent and transient
adult population within the plume exposure EPZ an adequate opportunity to
.
become aware of the information annually. The programs should include provision.
for written material that is likely to be available in a residence during an
emergency. Updated information shall be disseminated at least annually.
Signs or other measures (e.g., decals, posted notices or other means, placed
in hotels, motels, gasoline stations and phone booths} shall also be used to
disseminate to any transient population within the plume exposure pathway EPZ
appropriate information that would be helpful if an emergency or accident
occurs. Such notices should refe~ the transient to the telephone directory
or other sources of local emergency information and guide the visitor to
appropriate radio and televison frequencies.

'
I

G.5. Each organization shall conduct coordinated·ptcg:zams:.·at.least annually
toacqua i nt news media with emergency plans, i nfornr~ttorr concerning r.ad i at ion
and points of contact for release of publ it: ·i:ryfarrirttion.

n.

Emergency Facilities and Equipment

®:;~:; ,:i,;,:·~_,:'.«

Planninq Standard

'!:' ~ : ! ';

Adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support the emergency response
are provided and maintained. (NUREG-0654/FEHA-REP-1, p.52)
. i

Evaluation Criterion

•

I

i

H.lO. Each organization shall make provisions to inspect, inventory and
operationally check emergency equipment/instruments at least once each calendar
quarter and after each use. There shall be sufficient reserves of
instruments/equipment to replace those which are removed from emergency kits
for calibration or repair. Calibration of equipment shall be at intervals
·recommended by the supplier of the equipment.
N.

Exercise and Drills
Planninq Standard

Periodic exercises are (will be}· conducted to evaluate major portions of
emergency response capabilites, periodic drills are (will be) conducted to
develop and maintain key skills, and deficiencies identified as a result of
exercise and drills are (will be) corrected. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, p.71)
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Drill Requirements (Evaluatio:1

riteria)

N.2 .. Definition: A drill is a supervised instruction period aimed at .
testing, developing and maintaining skills in a particular operation.
A drill is
a component of an exercise. A drill shall be supervised
and evaluated by a qualified drill instructor. Each organization s-hall
conduct drill~, in addition to the biennial annual exercise a the
frequencies indicated below:
N.2.a. Communication Drills: Three types of communication drills are
addressed: (a) Communications with State and local governments within the
plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone shall be tested monthly;
(b) communications with Federal emergency response organizations and State(s)
within the ingestion pathway shall be tested at least once quarterly in
conjunction with the testing of plume exposure pathway measures of the
State plan and (c) communications between the nuclear facility, State and
local government emergency operations centers and field assessment teams
shall
test
at least once every year. Communication drills shall also
include the as
understanding the content of messages.
N.2.c. Medical Emergency Drills: A medical emergency_d:rtl.l involving a
simulated contaminated indiviaual that contairrs provisfons:Aor participation
by local su
rt service agencies (i.e., ambulance and offsite.medical
treatment fac 1ity) sha11 be conducted annually.
N.2.d. Radiological Monitoring Drills: Requirements are set forth for two
types of radiological ,monitoring drills: (a) Radiological monitoring drills
rtlated to
plume
pbsure pathway emergency planning zone shall be
condu ed at least annually and shall include provisions for communications
and record
ng. (b) Radiological monitoring drills related to the
ingestion exposure.pathway emergency planning zone shall be conducted at
leas annually and. shall include provisions for communications and record
keep ng.
·
··
Health Physics Drills: Health Physics drills shall be conducted
sem -a:.nnually by State governments with 1 icensees to test response to and
anal
s of simulated elevated airborne and liquid samples and direct
. rad
ion measurements in the environment. The State dri 11 s can be conducted
site.
N.2.e.

0.

Radiological Emer9ency Resoonse Training
Plannina Standard

Radiologic
called on

emergency response ·training is provided to those who may be
assist in an emergency. (NUREG-0654/FE~A-REP-1. p.75)
•

t

Evaluation Criteria
0.1

Each organization shall assure training of appropriate individuals.

54

.

"

O.l.b.

Each

~~on
~ i rl

trcnning.

po11ce
departments

<~lion
~

r e e;n P n t

•.

· • \i

shall partic::pate in and reuivP

., t between 1o c a 1 age nc i e s s ur I'

also be offered to the,,, ··1
mutual aid district.

ri r r ,

trainln:J sllall

rs

lish a training program for instructing and
ement radiological emergency response plans.
The special zed initial training and periodic retraining programs shall be
and frequency and should be provided in
defin
th res
to t i r sc
the following

0.4.
qualifying

a.
b.
c.
d.

f.
g.
h.
j .

Directors or coordinato s of response orgranizations;
responsible
accident assessment;
Personn
manito i
teams and radiological analysis personnel;
Radio 1og i
and f re
ghting personnel;
Police~ secu
rescue personnel;
First aid
services
rsonnel including Civil Defense/Emergency
local sup
Service
Medic
;I and
fo transmission of emergency information and
Per so
instructi

o. 5. Each
Citpersonn
P.

lI

11 provide for the initial anrl.annual retraining
res nse responsibilities.

Respo,sibi1ity for the Planninq Effort::.·Development. Periodic Review
ana Distribution or Emergency Plans
A:"

Responsibilities
plans are estab1is
. p.78)
.
Evaluation Crite

P.4.

ch o

. and certify

"-.I:

dev o
and review and for distribution of emergency:
, and planners are properly train~d. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-l;i

a

aniza

11

it to
.,
1nto account c

P.S. The erne
beforwarded to
for implementation
to show
re

ate its plan and agreements as needed, review
on a annual basis. The update shall tak.e
drills and exercises.

response plans and approved changes to the plans shall
anizati s and appropriate individuals with responsibility
plans
Revised pages shall be dated and marked
e been made.

P.lO.
ch o anizat
TTSts and maps in erne

a1

provide for updating telephone numbers, call-down
edures at least quarterly.

Appendix 3: Means Fo
idina Promot Alert and Notification of Response
Organizations And The Populat1on
Periodic
irements
delineated in a
rthc

ted to alert and notification will be discussed and
~

~
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SECTION C:

ANNUAL LETTER G= rERTIFICATION

In o er to facilitate the monitoring of REP planning and pre. 1r;·:iness
requirements as prescribed in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 and 44 CFP l.:J as
deli
1n this memorandun, an Annual Letter of Certificati ;n shall be
subm1
from each State to the appropriate FEMA Regional Director. The
State submission of the Annual Letter of Certification to the FEHA Regional
Director shou1~ be made by January 31 of each year and should address
compH.ance with periodic requirements for Hr· preceding year. This letter
shall include assurances that the requisite activities have been undertaken
or completed. as appropriate, by the State and local organizations for the·
following functions:
1. Public Education and Information (G): Means of dissemination of
information. dates, participants, sponsoring organizations and description
of
programs conducted to increase public and media radiological
emergency planning and response awareness.
I

Emergency Facilities and Equipment (H):
quantity and dates of checK/test.

Type of equipment/instrument,

3.
rcises (N): Testing of all major elements, conducting exercises under
various t1me and seasonal conditions, unannounced exercises and testing of
State (and local, as appropriate) plans for implementi-r~.::t~ti.::i1:t ~hway
measures.
:·- .....
4.";-~0ri11s (N): 7Jypes~.idat~s held and parttctpating org-arrizatious ..:.... _.
<·+.

' :"

'+'

~:·\~~:;J,:;,:(, ·,·~;·~.:~_.;'

>

5. Radiological-Emerg~Wc/-:Response Training (0): Scope and purpose of training,
dates held, numoer .of participants, agencies represented and sponsors of trainings
6. Update of Plans and Letters of Agreement (P): Verification that plans and
letters of agreeme'nt~'have been reviewea and appropriate changes made. Updates
of plans should tnclu~e telephone numbers, -call-down lists and maps.
7. Alert and Notification (Appendix 3): Type of tests conducted in accordance
with estaolished schedule, dates held, and operability percentage achieved based
on
riodic testing.

..

